Fordham Law Review
Volume 77

Issue 6

Article 7

2009

Adding Insult to Injury? The Untoward Impact of Requiring More
than De Minimus Injury in an Eighth Amendment Excessive Force
Case
Robyn D. Hoffman

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robyn D. Hoffman, Adding Insult to Injury? The Untoward Impact of Requiring More than De Minimus
Injury in an Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Case, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 3163 (2009).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol77/iss6/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Adding Insult to Injury? The Untoward Impact of Requiring More than De Minimus
Injury in an Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Case
Cover Page Footnote
J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2004, University of Michigan. I would like to
thank Professors James Kainen and Lloyd Weinreb for their invaluable guidance. Thank you Mom, Dad,
Evan, and Jacob for your constant love, support, and encouragement.

This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol77/iss6/7

ADDING INSULT TO INJURY?:
THE UNTOWARD IMPACT OF REQUIRING MORE
THAN DE MINIMIS INJURY IN AN EIGHTH
AMENDMENT EXCESSIVE FORCE CASE
Robyn D. Hoffman*
This Note explores the conflict over whether a prisonermust suffer more
than de minimis injury to sustain an Eighth Amendment excessive force
claim. It examines this conflict against the backdrop of the various
standards the U.S. Supreme Court adopted in its Eighth Amendment prison
conditions jurisprudence between 1976 and 1992, principallyfocusing on
the 1992 Hudson v. McMillian decision. Moreover, this Note considers the
intersection of "the evolving standards of decency," the "hands-off
doctrine," and the Eighth Amendment injury requirement. Ultimately, this
Note advocates that excessive force-when meted out as punishmentviolates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment regardless of whether a prisoner's injuries are more than de
minimis.
INTRODUCTION

In 1995, the New York Times reported on the violent culture of Clinton
Correctional Facility, a maximum security prison in upstate New York. 1
The article chronicled prison officials' "retaliatory" and "sadistic" use of
excessive force, including an incident where officers made an inmate who
they had assaulted kiss the steps on his way to the hospital. 2 Moreover, it
publicized that an inner circle of officials had colluded to remain quiet
about guards' blatant use of excessive force, resulting in spotty enforcement
3
of the prison's "strict rules" against such practices.
Less than one year later, the Los Angeles Times exposed California's
"most maximum-security prison," a facility with a similar record of inmate

* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2004, University of
Michigan. I would like to thank Professors James Kainen and Lloyd Weinreb for their
invaluable guidance. Thank you Mom, Dad, Evan, and Jacob for your constant love,
support, and encouragement.
1. See generally Matthew Purdy, Prison's Violent Culture Enveloping Its Guards, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 1995, at Al.

2. Id.
3. Id.
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abuse. 4 The article highlighted a prison tradition where "[s]hackled inmates
arriving from other prisons were pummeled by officers in an intimidation
rite called 'greet the bus."' 5 The article also reported on the officials'
practice of placing bitter prison rivals in the same cramped exercise yard-a
ritual known as "gladiator day"-to provide occasions for guards to enjoy
the institution's policy that allowed them to use firepower to stop
6
disturbances between inmates.
Despite these mid-1990s accounts that exposed unspeakable and
unnecessary acts of excessive force by prison officials, such practices
continue to occur in correctional facilities across the country. 7 In April
2008, two western Maryland prisons fired at least seventeen officers after a
large-scale probe uncovered violent abuse of roughly seven inmates. 8 One
of the inmates wrote to the Baltimore Sun from prison, claiming that after
the officers ordered him to put his face against a wall, they kicked him in
the head; then, despite his splattered blood all over the walls, the officers
9
continued to hit and kick him senselessly.
For every article published about such wanton and unnecessary use of
force by prison officials, however, thousands of incidents are not
publicized. 10 Moreover, in some circuits, obtaining Eighth Amendment

4. See generally Mark Arax, Tales of Brutality Behind Bars, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21,
1996, at Al.
5. Id.
6. Id. One retired prison lieutenant recounted eight-hour shifts with four or five
shootings in the yard. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH STATEMENT
TO THE VIRGINIA CRIME COMMISSION: SUPER-MAXIMUM SECURITY (1999), available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/1999/06/30/usdom5755_txt.htm
(criticizing Virginia's Red
Onion State Prison for its history of excessive force and abusive use of stun guns, as well as
a gratuitous firearms policy that the Department of Corrections defended because the
shotguns only carried rubber pellet "stinger rounds").
7. See
generally
Correction
Officers
Going
Wrong,
http://correctionofficersgoingwrong.wordpress.com (last visited Apr. 7, 2009) (exposing
various violations by correctional officers in the line of duty, including myriad narratives of
excessive force).
8. See John-John Williams IV, Nine Officers Firedfrom Prison: Guards Accused of
Assaulting Inmate at Facility in Hagerstown, BALT. SUN, Apr. 5, 2008, at B 1; News Release,
State of Md. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., Eight More Roxbury Officers Fired as
Excessive Force Probe Continues (Apr. 8, 2008), available at http://www.dpscs.state.md.us/
publicinfo/pdfs/pressreleases/20080408.pdf.
9. Gus G. Sentementes, State Prison Officers Under Investigation: Eight Accused of
Assault in Western Md., BALT. SUN, Mar. 28, 2008, at BI.
10. Nonetheless, recent news articles continue to expose and criticize prison officials'
use of excessive force in prisons across the country. See, e.g., Holly Becka & Doug J.
Swanson, Texas Youth Commission Scandal: Prisons Rife with Physical Abuse, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 9, 2007, at IA; Editorial, It's No Time for Federal Court to Stop
Oversight: Use of Force in California Prisons Remains an Issue, as Does the Code of
Silence, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 3, 2007, at B6; Jonathan Saltzman & Thomas Farragher,
Guards, Inmates a Volatile Dynamic, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11, 2007, at Al; Jonathan D.
Silver, Beaver County Official Backs Warden, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Jan. 25, 2007, at
W-6. But see Jon Gambrell, Prison Guards Can Use Force-Ark. Changes Rules to Deal
with Inmates, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, July 7, 2008, at B5 (discussing a change to Arkansas
law allowing officials to use force on inmates who fail to obey "lawful orders").
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redress can be a particularly daunting task for inmates who suffer minor
1
injuries.
Courts assess excessive force cases under the Eighth Amendment, guided
by a set of factors developed by the U.S. Supreme Court to ascertain
whether the use of force amounts to a constitutional violation. In Hudson v.
McMillian,12 the Supreme Court held that an Eighth Amendment excessive
force claim requires a prisoner to show that a prison official used force
13
maliciously and sadistically for the sole purpose of causing harm.
Moreover, the Court announced that serious injury is not a condition
precedent to a successful Eighth Amendment excessive force case. 14 The
Hudson Court did not, however, clearly define what minimum quantum of
injury, if any, a prisoner must prove to establish a constitutional violation.15
As such, the U.S. courts of appeals are divided over whether de minimis
injury can sustain an Eighth Amendment claim. 16
This Note argues that the Hudson Court clearly articulated a standard that
many circuit courts fail to follow as a way to remain hands-off to prison
management and as a method of limiting prisoners' redress through the
courts. Part I examines the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause jurisprudence, highlighting four Supreme Court cases
preceding Hudson that tackled the amendment's applicability to certain
prison conditions, while simultaneously refining Eighth Amendment
standards. Part I then studies Hudson, highlighting the particular standards
and factors to which courts must look in deciding prison excessive force
claims. Part I also discusses the arguments for and against the "hands-off
doctrine," a pre-1970s principle that courts employed to defer to state
legislatures and prison officials to regulate prisons, thereby limiting court
intervention.
Part II articulates the circuit court split resulting from varied
interpretations of Hudson and details arguments on both sides of the debate.
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits read the plain meaning of Hudson to state that a prisoner
does not need to suffer serious injury to sustain an Eighth Amendment
claim, whereas the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Fifth,
and Seventh Circuits hold that certain Hudson passages imply that, although
the injury need not be significant, a prisoner must prove more than de
minimis injury.
11. See infra Part II.B (examining the difficulties prisoners face in sustaining excessive
force claims in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh
Circuits when there is only de minimis injury). But see infra Part lI.A (discussing other
circuit courts that do not require such showing, thus enabling redress in more instances).
12. 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
13. Id. at 7-8.
14. Id. at 7.
15. See infra Part II.A-B (examining the circuit split resulting from this omission).
16. Compare infra Part II.A (noting certain circuit courts that do not require any discrete
level of injury), with Part II.B (discussing other circuit courts that hold that de minimis
injury is conclusive evidence of de minimis force, which therefore precludes recovery).

3166

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

Finally, Part III argues that, by failing to read the plain meaning of the
Hudson text, some courts have reinvigorated the hands-off doctrine, thereby
deferring to prison officials even in the face of constitutional violations.
Furthermore, Part III advocates that the Court must once again refine
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence so that a particular quantum of injury is
not required to prevail in cases where excessive force is used wantonly and
unnecessarily in violation of the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society. 17
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE: THE
STANDARDS THAT GOVERN PRISONERS' CLAIMS

Part L.A of this Note tracks the pre-Hudson Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause jurisprudence as applied to prison conditions and
defines the "evolving standards of decency" that guide courts in
determining what comports with the Eighth Amendment. Part I.B then
examines Hudson, the seminal case that set the standard for what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth
Amendment in prison excessive force cases. Finally, Part I.C discusses the
use of, and the breaking from, the "hands-off doctrine" that the Court
employed prior to the early 1970s as a way to defer to the legislature and
prison officials to manage prisons.
A. The History of the Eight Amendment as Applied to Prison Conditions
1. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."1 8 Prior to 1976, the Court invoked the Eighth Amendment Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause only in cases where it questioned the
constitutionality of death penalty procedures imposed on capital
defendants.19 Perhaps because of rising prison populations, 20 a change in
17. See infra Part I.A.2 (defining the "evolving standards of decency" that influence
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
19. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 443 (1890) (upholding electrocution as
constitutional because the specified electricity current brings about an immediate and
painless death and, therefore, does not constitute torture); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130,
135-36 (1878) (stating that punishments of torture-when circumstances of panic, shame,
and excess pain are "superadded" to the extinguishment of life, thereby imposing a
punishment worse than death-or other such unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by the
Eighth Amendment); cf Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) ("It suffices to note that
the primary concern of the drafters [with respect to the Eighth Amendment] was to proscribe
'torture[s]' and other 'barbar[ous]' methods of punishment." (alteration in original) (quoting
Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: " The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839, 842 (1969))).
20. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Statistics, Key
Facts at a Glance: Number of Persons Under Correctional Supervision, available at
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public sentiment toward prisoners' rights,2 1 the rise of a civil rights-civil
liberties bar that took over myriad cases that would have otherwise been
filed pro se,22 or increased media coverage of violence in prisons, 23 in 1976,
the Court for the first time examined the applicability of the Eighth
Amendment to prison conditions. 24 Subsequently, between 1976 and 1992,
the Court granted certiorari in a series of five cases in an attempt to parse
out the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to various prison-related
issues.
a. Estelle v. Gamble: The DeliberateIndifference Standard
In Estelle v. Gamble,2 5 J. W. Gamble, an inmate under the custody of the
Texas Department of Corrections, was injured when a bale of cotton fell on
him while he unloaded a truck during a prison work assignment. 26 Over the
three months following his injury, doctors examined Gamble seventeen
times at the unit hospital. 27 The doctors initially took Gamble off work
duty because of the injury, but then certified that he could partake in light
duty, despite his complaints that the pain had not subsided. 28 Gamble filed
a federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 198329 alleging that the Chief
Medical Officer, Prison Warden, and Director of Corrections subjected him
to cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment by
denying him adequate medical care. 30 The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas dismissed the case for failure to state a claim
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/corr2tab.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2009). The
number of people under U.S. correctional supervision in 1980 was 1,842,100. Id. In 2007,

that population rose to 7,328,200 persons, a 396% increase in 27 years. See id.
21. See CHADWICK L. SHOOK & ROBERT T. SIGLER, CONSTITUTIONAL
CORRECTIONAL ADMINISTRATION 8 (2000).

ISSUES

IN

Prior to the 1960s, inmates and the prisoners'

rights lobby made unsuccessful attempts at the state level to initiate changes to correctional
facility administration. Id. at 7-8. Because early prison philosophy held that prisoners
should lose all status in society and be treated in any way prison officials saw fit, inmates
had few rights. Id. at 7.
22. See 1 MICHAEL MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 10 (2d ed. 1993). Michael Mushlin
also contends that prisoners were "becoming increasingly militant and assertive," which
incited court intervention. Id.
23.

See JOHN A. FLITER, PRISONERS' RIGHTS:

THE SUPREME COURT AND EVOLVING

STANDARDS OF DECENCY 192 (2001).
24. See generally Gamble, 429 U.S. 97.
25. 429 U.S. 97.

26. Id. at 99.
27. Id. at 107.
28. See id. at 99-100.
29. Section 1983 provides a civil, tort-like remedy for individuals whose constitutional
rights are violated by a state actor. Section 1983 states, in part, that,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
30. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 101.
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upon which relief could be granted; 31 however, the Fifth Circuit reversed
32
and reinstated Gamble's complaint.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the denial of
medical care by prison officials was a viable Eighth Amendment claim.
Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the majority, held that, under the
facts, Gamble did not state a claim under § 1983 because doctors tried to
treat his condition seventeen times in three months. 33 Nevertheless, the
Court held broadly that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. ' 34 Furthermore, the Court stated
that its holding extends to situations where prison doctors fail to respond
appropriately to prisoners' needs or when prison officials intentionally deny
35
medical care or impede prisoner access to medical treatment.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, stating that a finding of cruel and
unusual punishment should not turn on an individual's subjective
motivation to inflict pain or punishment. 36 Rather, Justice Stevens believed
that the Court's inquiry should be into the character of the punishmentwhether the punishment was cruel and inhuman because of "design,
'37
negligence, or mere poverty."
b. Rhodes v. Chapman: Analyzing Both Subjective Intent
and Objective Harm
Five years later, in Rhodes v. Chapman,38 the issue was whether "double
celling" inmates-the act of housing two inmates in one cell-violates the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 39 At
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF), double-celled inmates shared
sixty-three square feet of cell space. 40 The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio held that double celling was cruel and unusual
punishment. 4 1 In making this determination, the court looked to several
31. Id. at 98.
32. Gamble v. Estelle, 516 F.2d 937, 941 (5th Cir. 1975).
33. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 107-08. Although doctors prescribed a variety of medicines to
alleviate J. W. Gamble's symptoms, Justice Thurgood Marshall conceded that the doctors
could have x-rayed Gamble's back or employed some other diagnostic method. Id. at 107.
Nevertheless, Justice Marshall stated that failure to order an x-ray was a medical decision
that, at most, amounted to medical malpractice. Id.
34. Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
35. Id. at 104-05.
36. Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299
(1991) (holding that the subjective inquiry is required in Eighth Amendment cases); infra
notes 79-82 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning behind the Wilson standard).
37. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 117.
38. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
39. Id. at 339-40.
40. Id. at 341.
41. See Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1977), rev'd, 452 U.S.
337 (stating that, although double ceiling is acceptable as a temporary measure, the
conditions at SOCF were in no way transitory).
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studies that recommended that each prisoner should have, at a minimum,
fifty to fifty-five square feet of living quarters. 4 2 Because of an increase in
Ohio's statewide prison population, which required SOCF to house more
prisoners than its original intended capacity, inmates at SOCF had
approximately twenty square feet per person less than this suggested
amount. 43 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding narrowly that double ceiling
is cruel and unusual punishment, but only under conditions akin to those at
SOCF. 44
Having not yet decided whether certain conditions of confinement
constitute punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide that issue. 45 Writing for the majority,
Justice Lewis Powell utilized a portion of the Gamble standard, stating that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that involve unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain, including such inflictions that are "'totally
without penological justification.' "46 Thus, when deprivation results in
physical torture or pain without any penological purpose, or if conditions of
confinement lead to deprivation of "basic human needs" or "the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities," such as food, medical care, and
sanitation, this constitutes cruel and unusual punishment violative of the
Eighth Amendment. 47 The Rhodes Court held that the conditions at SOCF
did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because the inmates were
not deprived of basic human needs; 48 moreover, double celling occurred
because of Ohio's teeming inmate population, not as a result of prison
officials' wanton infliction of pain. 49 In so holding, the Court stated that,
"[t]o the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are
part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society. '' 50 Justice Powell also noted that state legislatures and prison
officials are not insensitive to prisoners' needs or penal system goals. 51
42. Id. at 1020-21 (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 1021.
44. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 344 (discussing the holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit); Chapman v. Rhodes, 624 F.2d 1099, 1099 (6th Cir. 1980) (affirming
without opinion).
45, See generally Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337. Previously, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(1978), challenged the Arkansas state correctional system's practice of keeping inmates in
solitary confinement for indeterminate durations, subjected to infectious diseases, an
insufficient diet, and cells without beds. Id. at 682-83. Hutto, however, did not look at any
one particular prison's policies and practices of housing inmates.
46. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
47. See id. at 347.
48. Id. at 348. The Court distinguished Rhodes v. Chapman from Estelle v. Gamble and
Hutto. The difference in Gamble was that denial of medical care in the most extreme case
could result in torture, and in less severe situations could impose pain for no penological
reason. Id. at 347. Rhodes differed from Hutto, because Hutto inmates were denied a
sufficient diet and a bed to sleep on, thus resulting in "serious deprivations of basic human
needs." Id.
49. See id. at 348.
50. Id. at 347.
51. Id. at 352.
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Therefore, courts must tread lightly in prison management and perform
52
their only required duty-to protect constitutional rights.
Justices William Brennan, Harry Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens
concurred in the judgment but wrote about their disagreement with Justice
53
Powell on the issue of the Court's intervention in prison administration.
Justice Marshall was the sole dissenter, stating that the majority should not
have ignored the studies-which had swayed the Southern District of
Ohio's decision-that supported the finding that the standard of living at
SOCF put
prisoners in conditions so crowded that they could be seriously
54
harmed.
c. Whitley v. Albers: The Malicious and Sadistic Standard
Five years after Rhodes, the Court granted certiorari in an Eighth
Amendment case very different from its two predecessors. In Whitley v.
Albers,55 the Court addressed the issue of whether a prison official's use of
deadly force to quell a prison riot constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.
On the day in question, several prisoners were intoxicated at the Oregon
State Penitentiary. 56 Two guards attempted to move those inmates into
isolation, some of whom resisted.5 7 Inmate onlookers grew agitated at the
situation, believing that the officers were using too much force to move the
inmates, and several prisoners confronted the officers, taking one of them
hostage. 58 Harol Whitley, the prison guard manager, tried, without success,
to negotiate with an inmate who brandished a homemade knife and riled up
other inmates to break prison furniture. 59 Believing that an intervention
was necessary both to suppress the riot and to save the officer taken
hostage, Whitley organized and led an assault squad, armed with shotguns,
to the cellblock where the riot was ongoing. 60 Whitley advised his officers
to "shoot low" if any prisoners were climbing the stairs toward the hostage
officer.6 1 Gerald Albers, an inmate involved in the riot, began ascending

52. Id.; see also infra Part I.C.1 (discussing the Court's reluctance to intervene in prison
administration).
53. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Clourts are in the strongest
position to insist that unconstitutional conditions be remedied, even at significant financial
cost."); see also infra Part I.C.2 (discussing particular judges and commentators who believe
that courts' intervention in prison management is necessary to uphold prisoners' substantive
constitutional rights).
54. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 371-72 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also infra Part I.A.2
(discussing the evolving standards of decency that govern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
and that Justice Marshall's dissent highlighted).
55. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
56. Id. at 314.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 314-15.
59. Id. at 315.
60. Id. at 315-16.
61. Id. at 316.

2009]

DE MINIMIS INJURYAND EXCESSIVE FORCE

3171

the stairs, and an officer shot multiple times in Albers's direction. 62 A
63
bullet struck Albers in his knee.
Because Whitley posed a situation to the Court not of ongoing
deprivation or inhuman conditions of confinement, but of circumstances
64
where officers had taken security measures to control a crisis situation,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the five-Justice majority,
fashioned a new standard for such Eighth Amendment cases. 6 5 She stated
that "the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and
wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on 'whether force was applied in
a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm."' 66 Justice O'Connor
affirmed the holding of the district court, 6 7 finding that that the officer used
force to restore order and to ensure that the prison staff, the guard held
hostage, and the prisoners were safe. 68 Furthermore, Officer Whitley gave
the assault squad orders to shoot low, which did not evince an intention to
69
harm prisoners in a wanton and unnecessary way.
Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented, criticizing
the majority for again reading an express intent element into Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. 70 The dissent emphasized that a prisoner need
only show an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, which itself
already poses an extremely high burden on the prisoner to prove. 7 1 The
dissenting Justices strongly believed that the existence of a prison riot or
other similar disturbance should not lessen the constraints imposed on
prison officials and stated that there is no justification for imposing a higher
72
burden on prisoners in these types of cases.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See generally id. at 314-17.
65. Id. at 320.
66. Id. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor further stated that "[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not
inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing
conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over a
tumultuous cellblock." Id.at 319.
67. Albers v. Whitley, 546 F. Supp. 726, 735 (D. Or. 1982).
68. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322-26.
69. Id. at 324. Moreover, the Court claimed that officials cannot consider every
contingency or possible peril when confronted by a frenzied environment. Id. at 325.
70. Id. at 328-31 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see infra Part I.A. l.d (discussing Wilson,
where the Court held that to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must prove that
the prison official acted with culpable intent).
71. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 329. The dissent stated that the Court had previously
disavowed any intent requirement. Id.; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)
(opining that the evolving standards of decency "assessment does not call for a subjective
judgment"). Moreover, the dissent noted that the majority took the intent standard from
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033, where Judge Henry Friendly considered intent as one of
many factors, but not itself a dispositive element. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 329 n.1.
72. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 329-30. Justice Marshall posed a scenario that diminished the
strength of the majority's argument:
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d. Wilson v. Seiter: Culpable Intent Is Required
The issue of whether a prisoner must prove culpable intent to cause harm
remained a contentious issue in the Court after the dissent's lengthy
discussion of that issue in Whitley. 73 Thus, the Court granted certiorari in
Wilson v. Seiter74 to discuss this limited question after the Southern District
of Ohio granted summary judgment for the prison guards 75 and the Sixth
Circuit affirmed. 76 In his complaint, Pearly Wilson alleged that a number
of conditions of his confinement violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, including "overcrowding,
excessive noise, insufficient locker storage space, inadequate heating and
cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms, unsanitary
dining facilities and food preparation, and housing with mentally and
77
physically ill inmates."
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, returned to the Court's
previous Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to decide whether culpable
intent was necessary. 78 He recalled that Gamble required a prisoner to
prove that the offending official demonstrated "deliberate indifference" to
his medical needs, and furthermore, that such indifference amounted to an
"'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.' ' 79 The Court then stated that
Rhodes called for a two-part analysis: (1) an objective inquiry into whether
the deprivation was sufficiently serious, and (2) a subjective inquiry into
'80
whether the official acted with "a sufficiently culpable state of mind."
Finally, Whitley's standard imposed the heightened requirement that the
official act "'maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm."' 8 1 Drawing the holdings of these cases together, Justice Scalia
stated directly what the Whitley Court had previously implied: "These

For if prison officials were to drop a bomb on a cellblock in order to halt a fistfight
between two inmates, for example, I feel confident that the Court would have
difficulty concluding, as a matter of law, that such an action was not sufficiently
wanton to present a jury question, even though concededly taken in an effort to
restore order in the prison.
Id. at 333-34.
73. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text; see also supra note 36 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice John Paul Stevens's dissent in Gamble where he
urged that the Eighth Amendment does not require a subjective inquiry into the mind of the
offending official).
74. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
75. Id. at 296.
76. Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 867 (6th Cir. 1990).
77. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 296.
78. See generally id. at 296-303.
79. Id. at 297 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
80. Id. at 298.
81. Id. at 302 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). Justice
Antonin Scalia noted that the Eighth Amendment requires a prisoner to prove that the
official acted with more than a lack of due care for the prisoner's safety or well-being. Id.at
298-99 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319).
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cases mandate inquiry into a prison official's state of mind when it is
'82
claimed that the official has inflicted cruel and usual punishment.
The Court also for the first time distinguished the standards under which
conditions-of-confinement cases and prison disturbance cases are
analyzed. 83 In so doing, it stated that prison condition cases require no
higher a burden than the Gamble standard of deliberate indifference. 84 In
contrast, Whitley's malicious and sadistic standard governs emergency
85
situations, a finding made based on the facts facing the prison official.
Ultimately, "[o]ut of an abundance of caution," the Court vacated the Sixth
to the
Circuit's entry of summary judgment and remanded the case back
86
court of appeals to apply the deliberate indifference test to the case.
Justices Byron White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens concurred in the
judgment, but read the precedent upon which Justice Scalia based his
opinion in a very different way. The concurrence stated that Rhodes merely
made an inquiry into whether the punishment was, in fact, intentionally
doled out to harm the prisoner. 87 Thus, the only investigation is into the
objective severity of the inflicted punishment, not the subjective intent of
the prison official. 8 8 Moreover, the concurring Justices objected to the
majority's reliance on Gamble and Whitley-cases in which the petitioners
did not challenge conditions of confinement. 89 Additionally, it stated that
Whitley expressly articulated that conditions-of-confinement cases merely
require an objective inquiry and that the majority misread Whitley's dictum
90
in placing emphasis on the subjective inquiry in such cases.
Notwithstanding the minor disagreement by the concurring Justices,
Wilson was the culmination of an activist Court's prison condition
jurisprudence. From Gamble to Wilson, the Court laid a solid foundation
for the various standards that it would apply to the gamut of Eighth
Amendment prison cases.

82. Id. at 299. Justice Scalia further noted that the intent requirement is drawn directly
from the Eighth Amendment itself, which forbids pain inflicted when it is "formally meted
out as punishment." Id. at 300; see also McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 347 (7th Cir.

1991) ("Whether an injury... is 'punishment' depends on the mental state of those who
cause or fail to prevent it.").
83. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302.
84. Id. at 302-03. The deliberate indifference standard covers all conditions-ofconfinement cases, which includes medical care, as this "is just as much a 'condition' of [an
inmate's] confinement as the food he is fed, the clothes he is issued, the temperature he is
subjected to in his cell, and the protection he is afforded against other inmates." Id. at 303.
85. Id. at 302-03.
86. Id. at 305-06.
87. Id. at 308-09 (White, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 309.
89. See id. (stating that Gamble challenged inadequate medical care to one specific
inmate, not general access to medical care in prisons, and that the facts in Whitley were
clearly inapposite).
90. See id. at 310.
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2. The Evolving Standards of Decency
Even though Gamble, Rhodes, Whitley, and Wilson provided disparate
standards, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence before Gamble and throughout
these prison conditions cases continually emphasized the Court's desire to
have objective indicia-such as public attitude toward a given sanction, 9 1
findings by state legislatures, 92 or experts' opinions regarding a form of
punishment 93-help define Eighth Amendment standards "to the maximum
possible extent."'94 The Court calls this objective factors inquiry, looking to
"the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 95 Quite simply, the Eighth Amendment ensures that certain forms
of punishment-even though inflicted on unpopular people like prisoners
and capital defendants-comport with human dignity and the standards
of
96
decency owed to all persons, notwithstanding their criminal status.
For example, Justice Marshall's Rhodes dissent noted that when SOCF
was built, the state legislature made a judgment based on expert opinion
that cach prisoner should have his own cell and approximately sixty-three
square feet of personal space. 97 After the trial judge personally went to the
prison and viewed the conditions himself, the Southern District of Ohio
found that long exposure to SOCF's cramped conditions, to which twothirds of the inmates were subjected because of their lengthy or life
sentences, limited both physical and mental movement in a cruel way. 98 As
a result, Marshall criticized the
majority for its ruling that violated the
99
evolving standards of decency.
In the line of conditions-of-confinement cases, the Court made it clear
that the deliberate indifference to serious deprivations of basic human
necessities, such as medical care, food, shelter, and sanitation, do not accord

91. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 n.13 (1981).
92. Id. at 346-47 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-96 (1977); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-87 (1976)).
93. Id. at 372 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also FLITER, supra note 23, at 23 (noting that
state laws, jury-imposed sentences, and opinions of public interest groups are additional
objective yardsticks to determine if a particular punishment violates the evolving standards
of decency).
94. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980)).
95. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). In Trop v. Dulles, the Court questioned
whether the government violated the Eighth Amendment when it stripped a man of his
citizenship after he was found guilty of deserting the U.S. Army during wartime. Id. at 8788. Although this action did not impose any physical pain or torture per se, the Court
believed it caused the total destruction of an individual's status and political existence"punishment more primitive than torture." Id. at 101. The Court stated that "the words of the
Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static"; rather, the words must
respond to the evolving standards of decency. Id. at 100-01.
96. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) ("The State, even as it
punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings. A
punishment is 'cruel and unusual,' therefore, if it does not comport with human dignity.").
97. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 370-71.
98. Id. at 374.
99. Id. at 375.
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with the evolving standards of decency. 10 0 In Gamble, however, the Court
opined that, like inmate Gamble, not every prisoner who claims that he
receives inadequate medical treatment in prison states a valid claim under
the Eighth Amendment. 10 1 Rather, a prisoner must allege that prison
officials acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs because
02
only this type of indifference violates the evolving standards of decency.1
Despite its continual reliance on the evolving standards of decency, the
Court has conceded that a judgment of whether a punishment comports with
human dignity is nonetheless "imprecise and indefinite."' 1 3 Justice White's
Wilson concurrence highlighted that this imprecision could negatively
affect prisoners. Justice White feared that the ever-changing Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, with its high burdens on prisoners and
inapplicability to various situations, might insulate prison officials from
constitutional challenges, thus offending the evolving standards of
04
decency. 1
B. Hudson v. McMillian: The Court Responds to Excessive Force in
Prison
With the evolving standards of decency guiding the Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, and Whitley providing the standard for
excessive force used in emergency situations,10 5 Hudson v. McMillian was
the Court's next vehicle to refine the excessive force standard under the
Eighth Amendment. In Hudson, the issue was whether excessive force
and unusual
outside of an emergency context may constitute cruel
106
punishment if the prisoner does not suffer serious injury.
Keith Hudson, an inmate in a Louisiana state penitentiary, and Jack
McMillian, a correctional officer at the facility, were arguing early one
morning. 10 7 Assisted by his colleague, Officer Marvin Woods, McMillian
placed Hudson in handcuffs and shackles so that he could be walked to the
"'administrative lockdown' area." 10 8 Hudson alleged that on that walk,
100. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 308-09 (1991); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 34748; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).
101. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 116.
102. Id. at 106. When a prison official shows deliberate indifference to an inmate's
serious medical needs, this action offends the Eighth Amendment's "'broad and idealistic
concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency' against which ...penal
measures [are evaluated]." Id. at 102 (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir.
1968)).
103. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 361 (Brennan, J., concurring).
104. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 311 (White, J., concurring) ("The ultimate result 9f today's
decision, I fear, is that 'serious deprivations of basic human needs' will go unredressed due
to an unnecessary and meaningless search for 'deliberate indifference."' (quoting Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 347)).
105. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text (describing the majority and
dissenting opinions in Whitley).
106. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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Officer McMillian punched him about his body, while Woods kicked and
punched him from behind, and Officer Arthur Mezo, the supervisor on
duty, watched the assault, cautioning the guards "not to have too much
fun."10 9 As a result of the beating, Hudson suffered minor bruises, swelling
of his face, mouth and lip, loose teeth, and a cracked partial dental plate." 10
Magistrate Judge Stephen Riedlinger of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Louisiana, who the parties consented to hear the case,
awarded Hudson $800 after finding that Officers McMillian and Woods
used unnecessary force and that Officer Mezo encouraged their actions.11 1
The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed the magistrate's ruling. 112 The court
conceded that the force was objectively unreasonable and that the officials'
actions led to an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. 113
Nevertheless, it held that Hudson did not have an Eighth Amendment claim
because his injuries were "minor" and "required no medical attention. 11 4
The Court granted certiorari to decide two issues. As to the broad
question of which standard governs nonemergency excessive force cases,
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, extended the Whitley standard:
whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 115 To determine
whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, Justice O'Connor
stated that courts should apply a factors test, looking at (1) "the extent of
injury suffered," (2) "the need for application of force," (3) "the
relationship between that need and the amount of force used," (4) "the
threat 'reasonably perceived by responsible officials,"' and (5) "'any efforts
made to temper the severity of a forceful response.""' 16
As to the narrow issue of the case-whether a prisoner can make out an
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim even in the absence of serious
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Hudson v. McMillian, 929 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). The U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's test examined whether there was (1) significant
injury; (2) resulting from force that was clearly excessive to the need; (3) an excessiveness
that was objectively unreasonable; and (4) which constituted an unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain. Id. (citing Huguet v. Barnett, 900 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1990)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Justice O'Connor stated that it "works no innovation" to

extend the Whitley v. Albers standard to all cases involving excessive force by prison
officials because many of the concerns underlying her opinion in Whitley arise whenever
guards use force to maintain control over inmates. Id. Moreover, many courts of appeals had
already employed the Whitley standard in excessive force cases. Id. (citing Stenzel v. Ellis,
916 F.2d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 1990); Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1990)
(en banc); Haynes v. Marshall, 887 F.2d 700, 703 (6th Cir. 1989); Corselli v. Coughlin, 842
F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1988); Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d 1187, 1188 (11th Cir. 1987)). But
compare Corselli, 842 F.2d at 26 (extending the Whitley standard), with Meriwether v.
Coughlin, 879 F.2d 1037, 1048 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the deliberate indifference
standard applies). The latter two cases demonstrate inconsistent application even within a
given circuit.
116. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)).
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7 She stated that
injury-Justice O'Connor answered in the affirmative. 11
the "absence of serious injury is ...relevant to the Eighth Amendment
inquiry, but does not end it. 11 8 Justice O'Connor bolstered this holding in
two ways. First, she invoked the two-part test espoused in Rhodes, that a
prisoner must prove that (1) subjectively, the official acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind, and (2) objectively, the use of force was
wanton and unnecessary. 1 9 Second, she called upon the evolving standards
of decency to distinguish excessive force cases from conditions-ofconfinement cases. 120 Justice O'Connor opined that, in conditions-ofconfinement cases, the evolving standards of decency are violated only
when a prisoner proves extreme deprivation, because general discomfort is
part and parcel of any prison sentence. 12 1 In excessive force cases,
however, the central inquiry is regarding the force. If a prison official uses
force maliciously and sadistically for the sole purpose of causing harm,
"contemporary standards of decency are always violated. This is true
' 122
whether or not significant injury is evident.
Although the question before the Court was the extent of injury and how
that inquiry plays into an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, Justice
O'Connor went further. She noted that not all malicious pushes and shoves
by a prison guard create a federal cause of action. 123 Rather, "[t]he Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual' punishments necessarily
excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force,
provided that the use of force is not of a sort 'repugnant to the conscience of
mankind.""'124 Furthermore, she stated that Hudson's injuries-bruises,
swelling, loose teeth, and a cracked dental plate-were not de minimis
extent of Hudson's
injuries under the Eighth Amendment, and therefore, the
1 25
injuries did not justify a dismissal of his § 1983 claim.
Justice Stevens concurred in part and concurred in the judgment but
wrote separately for one major reason. He urged that nonemergency
126
excessive force cases do not justify the malicious and sadistic standard.

117. Id. at4.
118. Id. at7.
119. Id. at 8; see also id. at 7 ("[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor
that may suggest... [that an officer] 'evinced such wantonness with respect to the
unjustified infliction of harm."' (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321)); see also supra text
accompanying note 116 (defining the factors to which courts should look for the objective
inquiry).
120. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8-9.
121. Id.

122. Id. at 9.
123. Id. (citing a frequently quoted statement by Judge Friendly in Johnson v. Glick, 481
F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973), that "[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem
unnecessary in the peace of ajudge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional rights").
124. Id. at 9-10 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327). Rather than invoking the traditional
language of the evolving standards of decency, Justice O'Connor reworded the same concept
in Hudson v. McMillian as "the conscience of mankind." Id. at 10.
125. Id. at 10; see also infra Part II.B (discussing circuit courts that have taken this dicta
to be part of Hudson's holding).
126. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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When there is no threat to inmates, prison officials, or institutional security,
the license to use force is severely limited; therefore, Justice Stevens
believed that the test should merely be whether the prison guard's attack
resulted in an infliction of unnecessary and wanton pain. 127 Additionally,
Justice Stevens highlighted a fact that was not emphasized by the majority,
that Hudson was handcuffed and shackled, rendering him unable to fight
back when the officers beat him. 128 Thus, under the facts, any force
resulted in the infliction of unnecessary and wanton pain. 129
Justice Blackmun also concurred in the judgment, lauding the majority
for holding that excessive force claims under the Eighth Amendment do not
turn on whether there is significant injury. 130 Like Justice Stevens,
however, Justice Blackmun did not join the extension of the Whitley
standard to all excessive force cases. 13 1 Justice Blackmun additionally
highlighted two concerns that the majority opinion did not address. First,
he noted that an amicus brief for the respondent officers stated that the
significant injury requirement helped the Fifth Circuit sort through and pare
down prisoner excessive force petitions. 132 In response, Blackmun
castigated the Fifth Circuit for using this requirement in a self-serving
manner and at the expense of prisoners' substantive constitutional rights. 133
Second, Justice Blackmun interpreted the majority opinion to say that it
would not foreclose a prisoner's claim of psychological harm without
corresponding physical harm. 134 Moreover, in dicta, Justice Blackmun
noted that the majority opinion implied-albeit subtly-that "de minimis or
nonmeasureable pain is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment." 135
Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented. The dissent
claimed that the majority expanded the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
127. Id. at 13 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Unwin v. Campbell,
863 F.2d 124, 135 (lst Cir. 1988)).
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 13-14 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Harry Blackmun defined
"significant injury" as an injury that necessitates medical attention or leaves lasting marks.
Id. at 13.
131. Id. at 14. Blackmun noted that he dissented in Whitley and did not approve of the
malicious and sadistic standard in any prison-related context. Id.
132. Id. at 14; see Brief for Texas et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at *2021, Hudson, 503 U.S. I (No. 90-6531), 1991 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 346 ("It would, in
fact, cripple the eighth amendment and unreasonably burden the federal judiciary to invoke a
system which provides no objective method for winnowing the wheat from the chaff.").
133. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 15 (stating that protecting constitutional rights by "pure
policy preferences for the paring down of prisoner petitions" is an "audacious approach to
the Eighth Amendment"). Justice Blackmun cited the many measures that are used to
control docket management in the federal courts, including requiring a prisoner to exhaust all
administrative remedies before filing in federal court, providing prison officials with a
determination on a qualified immunity defense before trial, and enabling judges to dismiss a
complaint informapauperisif the action is frivolous. Id. at 15-16.
134. Id. at 16.
135. Id. at 17; see also infra Part II.B (discussing certain circuit courts that also interpret
the majority opinion to say that de minimis injury precludes redress under the Eighth
Amendment).
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Clause "beyond all bounds of history and precedent." 136 The gravamen of
Justice Thomas's dissent was that use of force that "causes only
insignificant harm to a prisoner may be immoral, it may be tortious, it may
be criminal, and it may even be remediable under other provisions of the
Federal Constitution, but it is not cruel and unusual punishment."'' 37 To
bolster his argument, Justice Thomas rehashed the language of Gamble, that
an inmate must allege deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and
Wilson, that the objective inquiry in an Eighth Amendment case asks
whether the deprivation was sufficiently serious.138 Furthermore, Justice
Thomas was baffled by the majority's extension of the Whitley standard to
all excessive force claims, even when no competing institutional concerns
were at issue. 139 Finally, the dissent urged that the various state
legislatures-not federal courts-wield the responsibility to prevent and
punish this type of conduct in prisons, implying that the Court should
140
remain hands-off to these types of cases.
C. The "Hands-OffDoctrine"
1. The Court's Reluctance to Involve Itself in Prison Administration
For over a century before Gamble was decided, the Court employed the
established and broad "hands-off doctrine" to prison management, affording1
4
officials wide discretion in the operation of correctional facilities.'
Tracing back to the late nineteenth century, courts regarded prisoners as
slaves of the state and of the institutions in which they served their

136. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 28 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
137. Id. at 18. Justice Clarence Thomas stated that such conduct by prison officials
induces feelings of anger, but that a feeling of contempt for such behavior should not turn
the Eighth Amendment into a national code of prison regulation. Id. at 28.
138. Id. at 20-22.
139. Id. at 24. Justice Thomas stated that Wilson v. Seiter explained that deliberate
indifference is the baseline mental state to establish an Eighth Amendment claim and a
departure from that is only justified in cases like Whitley, where officers respond to
emergency situations and their conduct under the circumstances can only be construed as
wanton if they act with intent to cause harm. Id. at 23-24. It was especially puzzling to
Justice Thomas that "society's standards of decency are not violated by anything short of
uncivilized conditions of confinement (no matter how malicious the mental state of the
officials involved), but are automatically violated by any malicious use of force, regardless
of whether it even causes an injury." Id. at 25.
140. Id. at 28-29.
141. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (stating that federal courts
should only intervene when a particular prison condition violates a prohibition in the
Constitution); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) ("Suffice it to say that the
problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are
not readily susceptible of resolution by decree."). See generally JOHN W. PALMER,
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 261-63 (5th ed. 1997) (tracking various conditions-

of-confinement decisions that followed the hands-off doctrine); SHOOK & SIGLER, supra note
21, at 7-15 (noting that "the federal government had no legal standing to interfere in the
operations of state institutions").
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sentences. 14 2 Prisoners forfeited their constitutional rights upon entering
14 3
prison and could only claim rights the state chose to extend them.
Moreover, the general public was apathetic to-or uninformed aboutprisoners' plights, thus assisting courts in maintaining this stance. 144 Even
in 1958, the Court affirmed the long-standing tradition of nonintervention in
Gore v. United States,14 5 where Justice Felix Frankfurter emphasized that
the Court would not enter the domain of prison management because that
would unconstitutionally intrude on legislative responsibilities.' 46 Because
only those who face day-to-day correctional operations truly know what
prison is like and what policies need to be in place, the Court traditionally
regarded the federal courts as "ill suited to act as the front-line agencies for
the consideration and resolution of the infinite variety of prisoner
47
complaints."'
In Eighth Amendment cases, the Court has also historically given
deference to prison administrators. This obeisance stems from a variety of
policy considerations. 148 One consideration is that prison administrators are
in the best position to know what is needed to preserve institutional order
and security, how to discipline inmates, and what policies are required to
ensure that the goals of the penal system are reached. 14 9 Courts are
unwilling to overstep their bounds in this realm because prison operations
are multifaceted and complicated. 150 Thus, the hands-off approach merely
142. See, e.g., Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 798-99 (1871) (holding
that the Court defers to the laws and regulations of a state with respect to conditions of penal
servitude).
143. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 528 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing
Ruffin, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 796).
144. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 358 (1981) ("Public apathy and the political
powerlessness of inmates have contributed to the pervasive neglect of the prisons."); see also
Charlton T. Lewis, The Indeterminate Sentence, 9 YALE L.J. 17, 27 (1899) (opining that
"construction of a rational jurisprudence of crime" cannot occur until the public rejects
improper sentencing of prisoners); Note, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of "Final"
AdministrativeDecisions, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 551, 580 (1956) ("Today's prisoner appears to
be a forgotten man. . . .[Habeas corpus decisions] may very well rest largely upon the
underlying apathy of the general public toward prison reform .. ");Doretha M. Van Slyke,
Note, Hudson v. McMillian and Prisoners' Rights: The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh
Away, 42 Am.U. L. REv. 1727, 1727-28 (1993) (opining that public disdain and apathy for
prisoners facilitate the infringement of inmates' rights to go unnoticed).
145. 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
146. Id. at 393.
147. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 n.9 (1974).
148. See MUSHLIN, supra note 22, at 7-8 (discussing the many policy reasons for the
hands-off doctrine, including (1) separation of powers concerns; (2) federalism principles;
(3) courts believing they lack the expertise to manage prisons; (4) a way to protect judges
from hearing baseless prisoner complaints; and (5) the great deal of time judges would have
to expend to hear cases and fashion remedies, which could overload already onerous
dockets).
149. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986).
150. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977); see also
Mikel-Meredith Weidman, Note, The Culture of Judicial Deference and the Problem of
Supermax Prisons, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1505, 1523 (2004) (arguing that courts are "not
necessarily resistant to the culture of deference" because judicial reverence for prison
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"reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism" that federal courts are
15 1
unqualified to reform prison administration.
A second reason to maintain a hands-off approach is that courts must
show a level of trust in prison officials that they will do their jobs correctly,
respecting constitutional limitations. 152 The Rhodes majority stated that
courts cannot presuppose that state legislatures and prison officials will
push constitutional concerns aside so that they can achieve self-interested
goals. 153 Rather, officials should be afforded deference that they will
punish justly and will make policy choices that are sensitive to the U.S.
Constitution and the evolving standards of decency. 154 Because prison
officials have the expertise and already bear onerous responsibilities in the
administration of their jobs without federal court intervention, interference

administration decisions has quite simply become "a culture or ethos to which many lower
courts aim to conform their conduct").
151. Jones, 433 U.S. at 126 (quoting Procunier, 416 U.S. at 405). But see MUSHLIN,
supra note 22, at 8 (arguing that this policy concern "rests on a misconception of the
judiciary's role in prison cases" because courts get involved merely to rectify constitutional
violations, not to micromanage prisons generally).
152. Congress empowers the Bureau of Prisons to "manage[] and regulat[e] ... all
Federal penal and correctional institutions" and to "provide for the protection, instruction,
and discipline of all persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United
States." 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(1), (3) (2006); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352
(1981) (advocating that, absent contrary evidence, courts cannot presuppose "that state
legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution");
FLITER, supra note 23, at xvi ("Many judges felt that intervention would weaken the
authority of corrections officials and undermine discipline among inmates."); cf Emily
Calhoun, Comment, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A
Reappraisal, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219, 246 (1977) (claiming that until the public
condemns a particular condition in prison, the Court will remain deferential because
legislative approval is objective indicia that a condition comports with the evolving
standards of decency).
153. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352; MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL
POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS
380-81 (1998) (discussing courts' inherent inability to implement lasting change in prisons
because separation of powers requires that the politically accountable branches establish
such social policy). But see FLITER, supra note 23, at xvi (observing that those who are
politically accountable have also remained hands-off to prison reform so as not to appear to
their constituents that they are "soft on crime," because there are few political benefits that
would result); Van Swearingen, Note, Imprisoning Rights: The Failure of Negotiated
Governance in the Prison Inmate Grievance Process, 96 CAL. L. REv. 1353, 1381 (2008)
(arguing that courts must intervene because elected officials have failed to "show true
leadership" in rectifying abuse in prison); cf Ahmed A. White, The Concept of "Less
Eligibility" and the Social Function of Prison Violence in Class Society, 56 BUFF. L. REV.
737, 788 (2008) (commenting that even district attorneys do not want to intervene in
excessive force cases because they, too, are elected, and prisoners do not vote, but prison
guards do).
154. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22; Michael S. Feldberg, Comment, Confronting the
Conditionsof Confinement: An Expanded Role for Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 367, 371 & n.20 (1977) (stating that legislative prison reform is favored over
judicial activism because the legislature is not impeded by the same practical difficulties
facing courts, and thus can bring about longer lasting change).
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by the courts
could render an "already daunting task virtually
55
impossible."1
Congress reinforced the Court's position of nonintervention with the
passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 156 which
limited the type and scope of remedies that courts may provide to prisoners.
One of the PLRA's purposes was to "restrain liberal Federal judges who see
violations of constitutional rights in every prisoner complaint and who have
57
used these complaints to micromanage State and local prison systems."'
The PLRA signaled Congress's desire for inmates to air their grievances
through internal prison compliance structures by (1) requiring state
prisoners to exhaust all internal prison grievance procedures before filing a
case in federal court; 158 (2) imposing filing fees on indigent prisoner
litigants; 159 (3) enabling courts to reject claims of emotional injury without
corresponding physical injury; 160 and (4) initiating a "three-strikes" rule
that forbids prisoners from filing in federal court after three previous claims
have been dismissed as frivolous.161 The PLRA "worked as intended," and
62
decreased federal inmate court filings by forty-three percent in six years. 1
2. Breaking from the Hands-Off Doctrine: Why the Court
Should Get Involved
63
Even before the hands-off doctrine formally ended in the early 1970s,1
lower courts and a small number of Supreme Court Justices saw the flip
side of the judiciary's failure to get involved in prison reform and urged
courts to step in when substantial constitutional rights are at issue. For
example, in his Rhodes concurrence, Justice Brennan argued that lower
courts have never been overeager to bear the responsibilities of ensuring

155. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 386-87 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(advocating for the hands-off approach); see also Simeon Goldstein, Note, Prisoners with
AIDS: Constitutional and Statutory Rights Implicated in Family Visitation Programs, 31
B.C. L. REV. 967, 1023 (1990) ("Courts presume that... [prison] regulations and policies
are rationally related to legitimate penological interests. The presumption of good faith ends
only when prison regulations may violate constitutionally protected rights of prisoners.").
156. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28 & 42 U.S.C.).
157. 141 CONG. REc. S14,414 (Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bob Dole); see also id.
at S 14419 (statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham) ("[No longer will prison administration be
turned over to Federal judges for the indefinite future for the slightest reason. Instead, the
States will be able to run prisons as they see fit unless there is a constitutional violation, in
which case a narrowly tailored order to correct the violation may be entered.").
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (2000).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
162. Swearingen, supra note 153, at 1376.
163. See MUSHLIN, supra note 22, at 9 (discussing two early 1970s cases-Procunierv.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)-that
"sounded the death knell to the hands-off doctrine"). But see infra Part III.A (arguing that
some circuits have revived the hands-off doctrine by requiring a showing of more than de
minimis injury in Eighth Amendment excessive force cases).
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basic humanity in prisons; rather, he advocated that courts are the in the
"strongest position to insist that unconstitutional conditions be remedied,"
which can be done even while a court is being deferential to prison policies
and practices. 164
Likewise, Justice Marshall's Rhodes dissent criticized the majority for
their "unfortunate dicta" that federal courts could read as a warning to stay
out of prison operations.165 He believed this dicta gave courts a furtive way
66
out of sanctioning prison officials' use of cruel and unusual punishment. 1
Likewise, Justice White highlighted a similar point in his Wilson
concurrence. Justice White stated that the Wilson court had departed from
precedent in holding that the Eighth Amendment requires an inquiry into
whether a prison official had a culpable state of mind. 167 In so doing, he
hinted that the Court had imposed this higher burden on prisoners because
prison officials deserve deference in how they carry
the Court believed that
8
out prison policies. 16
Furthermore, in his Hudson concurrence, Justice Blackmun aired his
disdain for the Fifth Circuit's use of the "significant injury" requirement as
a way to pare down prisoners' excessive force petitions. 169 Justice
Blackmun believed that the Court must take an activist approach to hearing
Eighth Amendment cases because the "right to file for legal redress in the
as to any other citizen. Indeed, for the
courts is as valuable to a prisoner
170
prisoner it is more valuable."'

164. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 354, 359, 362 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
165. See id. at 375 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority's statement that, in
overseeing prison administrations, "courts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison
officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal
justice system").
166. Id.; see also Mann v. Reynolds, 828 F. Supp. 894, 902 (W.D. Okla. 1993) (stating
that it is a federal court's responsibility to remain aware of prisoners' constitutional rights
after being convicted and imprisoned).
167. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 310 (1991) (White, J., concurring).
168. See id. Justice Byron White stated further that the majority's standard would enable
prison officials to defeat § 1983 challenges as a trickle-down effect of this deference. Id. at
311.
169. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text; see also Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
Justice John Marshall Harlan urged that courts' fears of mushrooming caseloads and a dearth
of judicial resources "should not be permitted to stand in the way of the recognition of
otherwise sound constitutional principles." Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411.
170. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also
Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754, 758 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e extend wide ranging deference to
the judgment and policies of the prison officials who must maintain internal order and
discipline .... Our deference, however, does not insulate actions taken in bad faith or

actions that amount to a wanton infliction of pain for no legitimate reason." (citing Whitley
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322 (1986))); Lisa Gizzi, Note, Helling v. McKinney and Smoking
in the Cell Block: Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 1091, 1129 (1994)
(arguing that when a state fails to ensure prisoners are housed in safe conditions, a court
must step in for redress).
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Members of the prisoners' rights lobby, scholars, and legal
commentators, among others, have also taken a hard stance against judicial
nonintervention. For example, in 2005, the Commission on Safety and
Abuse in America's Prisons, a twenty-one member nonpartisan panel
comprised of a former circuit court judge, attorneys, seasoned correctional
officers, civic leaders, and former prisoners, explored the gravest problems
facing U.S. correctional facilities. 171 Among the Commission's thirty
recommendations for prison reform in its June 2006 report, Confronting
Confinement, 172 it urged federal courts to play an important role in
monitoring abuse in prison and advocated changes to the PLRA so that
federal courts could deliver justice to the many inmates who confront abuse
73
in prisons. 1
John J. Gibbons, former Chief Judge of the Third Circuit and a member
of the Commission, recently spoke about prison conditions and inmate
abuse before the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security. 174 In his comments, he noted
his bias about the powerful change that he believes judges can make, but
stressed that at times courts have been the only means of oversight of
correctional facilities. 17 5 Moreover, Gibbons advocated that federal court
intervention led to myriad successes, including a reduction in
overcrowding, the revamping of out-of-date prisons, improved medical and
76
health services for prisoners, and a decrease in the use of excessive force.1
John Boston, the director of the New York Legal Aid Society's
Prisoners' Rights Project, also advocated for courts' intervention when
prisoners' constitutional rights are at issue. 177 Speaking from the
perspective of a lawyer who has brought numerous class action lawsuits on
171. See Press Release, Comm'n on Safety & Abuse in Am.'s Prisons, National
Commission to Examine U.S. Prison Conditions: Post-Abu Ghraib, Panel to Study U.S.
Prisons and Their Impact on Prisoners, Corrections Officers and Society at Large (Mar. 1,
2005), availableat http://www.prisoncommission.org/press release_030105.asp.
172. COMM'N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AM.'S PRISONS, CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT

(2006), availableat http://www.prisoncommission.org/pdfs/Confronting-Confinement.pdf.
173. See id. at 16.
174. See generallyPrison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 4109 Before the
H. Judiciary Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec., 1l0th Cong. (2008)

(testimony of Honorable John J. Gibbons, Senior Director, Gibbons P.C.).
175. Id. at 2. Judge John J. Gibbons went on to emphasize that "the improvement of
safety and reduction of abuse in prisons in America benefits everyone, including correctional
staff, inmates' family members, and the greater public." Id. at 3.
176. Id. at 2. Judge Gibbons bolstered this contention by citing successful class action
cases that curbed patterns of excessive force. For example, he praised Sheppard v. Phoenix,
210 F. Supp. 2d 450, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), where Rikers Island Correctional Facility in
New York City successfully implemented institutional changes that halted a pattern of
excessive force. Id.
177. See John Boston, Project Dir., Prisoners' Rights Project, Legal Aid Soc'y,
Testimony Prepared for the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America's Prisons 17 (Apr.
20, 2005) [hereinafter Testimony of John Boston], transcript available at
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/boston.john.pdf (stating that litigation brings
about desired reform, but conceding that it is a "blunt instrument for reforming complex
institutions").
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behalf of injured prisoners, Boston has noted that New York State court
intervention on issues of excessive force resulted in a marked decrease in
prison official violence "with no loss of administrative control."'1 78
Likewise, commentators have underscored the notable changes that
judicial activism has brought about for prisoners, even stating boldly that
"litigation has probably been the single most important source of change in
prisons and jails during the past forty years."' 179 Thus, despite some prison
officials' resentment toward court involvement in rectifying prisoner abuse
issues, some scholars believe that judicial intervention places prison reform
on the public agenda, contributing to much needed change in U.S.
correctional facilities.' 80
II. DISSECTING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT-WHETHER A PRISONER MUST PROVE
MORE THAN DE MINIMIS INJURY TO SUSTAIN AN EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIM
The Hudson Court took the Eighth Amendment in a different direction
than previous Eighth Amendment jurisprudence had seen before. The
Court said that a petitioner does not need to prove serious injury to prevail
on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. 181 In so holding, however,
the Court failed to define what constitutes "serious," "significant," "minor,"
"minimal," or "de minimis"' 82 injury for purposes of this inquiry, words
used throughout the Hudson opinion and in the Court's previous Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. 183 The majority did not want to define these
178. John Boston, Excessive Force in the New York City Jails: Litigation and Its
Lessons, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 155, 167 (2006).
179. Malcolm M. Feeley & Van Swearingen, The Prison Conditions Cases and the
Bureaucratizationof American Corrections: Influences, Impacts, and Implications, 24 PACE
L. REv. 433, 442 (2004).
180. Id. Moreover, Professor Malcolm M. Feeley of U.C. Berkeley Boalt Hall School of
Law and practicing attorney Van Swearingen endorsed "four powerful trends" that prison
reform litigation incited: (1) increased professionalism within prisons; (2) standardization
across correctional facilities for best policies and practices; (3) a proliferation of the federal
government's interest in supervising prison facilities; and (4) "the last step in
constitutionalizing the criminal process." Id.
181. See supra text accompanying note 118 (discussing the narrow holding in Hudson).
182. The Latin phrase "de minimis" means trifling, minimal, or something "so
insignificant that a court may overlook it in deciding an issue or case." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 464 (8th ed. 2004). The phrase comes from the larger de minimis non curat lex,
which means that the "law does not concern itself with trifles." Id. For the purposes of an
Eighth Amendment inquiry, courts have failed to define explicitly what constitutes a de
minimis injury. See, e.g., Luong v. Hatt, 979 F. Supp. 481, 486 (ND. Tex. 1997) (noting that
the Fifth Circuit had not offered a definition of de minimis injury, but that the inquiry should
require a commonsense approach-whether the injury at issue would "require or not require
a free world person to visit an emergency room, or have a doctor attend to, give an opinion,
diagnosis and/or medical treatment for the injury"); cf L. Allan Parrott, Jr., Note, Hudson v.
McMillian andPrisoners' Rights in the 1990s: Is the Supreme Court Now More Responsive
to "Contemporaneous Standards of Decency"?, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 151, 166 (1992)
(commenting that after Hudson courts would dismiss cases with only de minimis injury,
"thereby putting a new premium on what is and what is not de minimis injury").
183. See John J. Phillips, Note, Jailhouse Shock: Hudson v. McMillian and the Supreme
Court's Flawed Interpretationof the Eighth Amendment, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 355, 373, 391
(1993) (highlighting the Court's failure to define many other commonly used Eighth
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amorphous words, and perhaps for good reason. For, if the Court had
"defined the term 'serious,' that act would have granted a prison official the
authority to use excessive force so long as he did not cross some arbitrary
line and inflict a significant injury upon his victim." 184 However, the Court
failed to discuss or expressly define in Hudson what level of injury can
sustain an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, an issue on which the
circuits are split.
Part II.A examines the circuit courts that have stringently adhered to the
Hudson text by looking at the force applied rather than the injury
inflicted, 185 which Justice O'Connor stated was the integral inquiry in an
excessive force case. 186 Part II.B, however, highlights cases from a handful
of circuit courts that have interpreted Hudson to state that some fixed
minimum quantum of injury is necessary, although the injury need not be
87
significant.1
A. The Injury Need Not Be Significant: The Third, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits'Approach
One set of circuits employ the plain meaning of Hudson by looking
directly at the force an officer used and whether the officer evinced
malicious or sadistic intent to cause the prisoner harm. 188 Under this
interpretation of Hudson, the injury that a prisoner sustains is examined, but

Amendment words and phrases, including "cruel," "unusual," "unnecessary and wanton,"
and "totally without penological justification"). Nonetheless, one can draw on Hudson's oral
argument to determine what the term "de minimis" means to the Court. For example, in
attempting to elicit from the prison guards' counsel what injury requirement the Court
should adopt, a Justice noted, "I think I can understand the level that you might call de
minimis. You know, it's really negligible. I guess a slap over the knuckles with a ruler or
something like that .. " Transcript of Oral Argument at *24, Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1 (1992) (No. 90-6531), 1991 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 245. The Hudson opinion, however,
did not reflect any meaningful discussion about what constitutes de minimis injury.
184. Diana L. Nelson, Note, Hudson v. McMillian: The Evolving Standardof Eighth
Amendment Application to the Use of Excessive Force Against Prison Inmates, 71 N.C. L.
REv. 1814, 1837 (1993).
185. See infra Part II.A (focusing on case law from the Third, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits that hold that prisoners do not need to prove more than de minimis injury).
186. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7 ("[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using
excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core
judicial inquiry is that set out in Whitley: whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.").
187. See infra Part II.B (discussing how the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits
have pieced together different portions of Justice O'Connor's Hudson opinion to find that a
prisoner must allege more than de minimis injury to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim).
188. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7. The Hudson court held that the Eighth Amendment
does not recognize de minimis uses of physical force because not every push or shove
violates a prisoner's constitutional rights. Id. at 9-10. The Court did not, however, expressly
discuss de minimis injury, likely because the central inquiry under the Eighth Amendment is
the force.
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is merely one of many factors to which a court looks in determining
whether the force was excessive under the circumstances. 189
1. The Sixth Circuit: Moore v. Holbrook
The Sixth Circuit was the first circuit to undertake applying Hudson to a
new set of facts. In Moore v. Holbrook,190 the facts were hotly disputed.
Nevertheless, the Southern District of Ohio accepted the prison officials'
version of the facts and held that the injuries were de minimis and
temporary, and, therefore, that the amount of force used was neither
inordinate nor excessive. 191
In Moore, there had been a riot in the Southern Ohio Correctional
Facility where inmates flooded the cellblock, started fires, and threw objects
at inmates and prison officials. 192 Inmate William Moore claimed that the
day after the riot, three officers came to his cell, handcuffed him, punched
him in the face, placed a stun gun between his arms, and dragged him out of
his cell and up a set of stairs, punching and kicking him the entire way. 193
The officers disputed those facts, claiming that during the day Moore
alleged he was beaten, the riot was still in progress, and Moore was heavily
involved. 194 They stated that as they were taking Moore, who had been
handcuffed, up the stairs, he fell on top of Troy Holbrook, one of the
officers. 195 Moore claimed, and his medical records confirmed, that he
suffered an edema (swelling) on his forehead, slight cuts on his wrists, and
pain in his right shoulder, beneath both arms, and in his groin. 196
The Sixth Circuit utilized the subjective and objective tests set forth in
Rhodes to analyze the case. 197 Under the subjective test, the court stated
that the inquiry is merely whether the officer's wantonness reveals itself
through the use of malicious and sadistic force for the very purpose of
causing harm. 198 The court also opined that, under the objective test, "no
actual injury needs to be proven to state a viable Eighth Amendment

189. Id. at 7 ("[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest
'whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary' in a particular
situation, 'or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of
harm .. .- (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986))); see supra text
accompanying note 116 (laying out the factors test used to determine whether the use of
force was wanton and unnecessary).
190. 2 F.3d 697 (6th Cir. 1993).
191. Id. at 698, 701.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. William Moore denied any involvement in the riot whatsoever. Id. at 704.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 698, 704.
197. See supra text accompanying note 80 (discussing the objective and subjective
inquiries for an Eighth Amendment claim).
198. Moore, 2 F.3d at 700 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991)).
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claim."' 99 Because the court believed that there were genuine issues of
material fact, it reversed the judgment of the Southern District of Ohio and
2
remanded the case. 00
2. The Third Circuit: Brooks v. Kyler
In Brooks v. Kyler, 20 1 the Third Circuit also discussed whether an inmate
needs to prove more than de minimis injury to sustain an Eighth
Amendment claim. In that case, inmate Alan Brooks had been approved to
make a legal phone call while being handcuffed to a waist restraint belt. 202
Ten minutes into the call, an officer told Brooks to hang up the
telephone. 20 3 Before he actually hung up, however, another officer rushed
into the room and punched Brooks in the head, causing him to fall onto the
floor. 204 While on the floor (and still handcuffed to the waist restraint),
various officers punched, kicked, choked, and verbally abused Brooks. 20 5
Brooks sustained abrasions on his neck and hands, suffered an increase in
his already-high blood pressure, and displayed an onset of anxiety and
206
depression.
Using a textual approach to Hudson, the Third Circuit reversed the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania's entry of summary
judgment.20 7 The court stated, "As we read [Hudson], the Supreme Court is
committed to an Eighth Amendment which protects against cruel and
unusual force, not merely cruel and unusual force that results in sufficient
injury. '20 8 Thus, even though Brooks only displayed "minor" or "de
minimis" injuries, the court strongly indicated that the focus is on the force
used and whether that force is wanton and unnecessary under the objective
factors test. 209 The court further held that "there is no fixed minimum
quantum of injury that a prisoner must prove that he suffered through
objective or independent evidence in order to state a claim for wanton and
2 10
excessive force."

199. Id. (citing Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1154-55 (6th Cir. 1991), a preHudson case where the Sixth Circuit expressed its view that a prisoner may recover for an
Eighth Amendment violation in the absence of actual injury).
200. Id. at 702.
201. 204 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2000).
202. Id. at 104.
203. Id.
204. Id.

205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id. at 104-05.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 108; see also Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 2002) (following

Brooks).
209. Brooks, 204 F.3d at 108.

210. Id. at 104.

2009]

DE MINIMIS INJURY AND EXCESSIVE FORCE

3189

Additionally, the court criticized the Fourth Circuit's approach to this

issue in Norman v. Taylor,2 11 where the court held that de minimis injury is

conclusive evidence that de minimis force was used. 2 12 The court found the
Fourth Circuit's reading of Hudson "unsatisfactory" because any wanton
use of force against a prisoner, even absent concurrent injury, should
preclude

dismissal

Amendment.

21 3

of an

excessive

force

claim under the Eighth

3. The Eighth Circuit: United States v. Miller
Case law from the Eight Circuit closely follows the Third and Sixth
Circuits' excessive force jurisprudence. In United States v. Miller,2 14 the

Eighth Circuit was faced with a case where the petitioner suffered only a
"'busted' and bloodied lip" and a hurt leg; however, the facts surrounding

the use of force showed much more malicious intent than the injuries
suggested. 2 15 When inmate Climmie Jones was acting disorderly, Officer

Arlen Whitley took him into a detoxification room to "cool off."'2 16 In the
room, Jody Ray Miller, another officer, punched Jones with a closed fist,

causing Jones to fall onto the floor. 217 Then, Miller, who was wearing
boots, kicked and stomped on Jones's upper body. 2 18 Other officers who
were present during the beating stated that Miller had no penological reason

for the force, especially because Jones was not resisting. 2 19 Nevertheless,
Officer Miller argued that there was inconclusive evidence of cruel and
unusual punishment because Jones's injuries were not serious. 220 The
Eighth Circuit disagreed, finding Miller's "unjustified attack" excessively
211. 25 F.3d 1259 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also infra notes 248-57 and
accompanying text (discussing Norman v. Taylor and the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of
the injury requirement).
212. Brooks, 204 F.3d at 108.
213. Id.; see also Carrasco v. Campagna, No. C 03-4727 SBA (PR), 2005 WL 2171884
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2005). In Carrasco v. Campagna, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California highlighted the circuit split as to whether a prisoner must
prove more than de minimis injury in excessive force cases. Id. at *5. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has not addressed the issue, except in a surface manner in
Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2002), a case that discussed the physical injury
standard that should be applied to cases filed under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA). In Oliver, the Ninth Circuit noted that it did not agree with the Fifth Circuit, which
requires that a prisoner prove an injury that is more than de minimis. Id. at 628. The court
further stated that the Fifth Circuit's reading of Hudson "does not accurately describe the
Eighth Amendment standard enunciated by the Supreme Court." Id.
214. 477 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 2007).
215. Id. at 646.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. Jody Ray Miller also called Climmie Jones derogatory racial epithets. Id.
219. Id. Officer Arlen Whitley spoke up against Officer Miller by alerting authorities that
Miller told him to write a "good report," which would leave out any mention of the assault
on inmate Jones. Id.; cf infra Part III.B (discussing the documented problem within
correctional facilities that officers substantiate colleagues' fabricated stories to assist them in
dodging punishment for using excessive force).
220. Miller, 477 F.3d at 647.
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sadistic and cruel. 221 Furthermore, the court stated that "the fact that Miller
may have been able to inflict even greater injuries upon Jones [did] not
make the attack any less malicious or sadistic." 2 22
4. The Tenth Circuit: United States v. La Vallee
In United States v. La Vallee,22 3 the Tenth Circuit agreed that Hudson did
not state that an inmate must prove a particular quantum of injury to sustain
an excessive force claim. 224 LaVallee stemmed from a three-year
government probe into widespread prisoner abuse and document
falsification at the U.S. Penitentiary Administrative Maximum Facility in
Florence, Colorado (ADX Florence). 225 The investigation uncovered a
conspiracy among certain prison guards to abuse aggressive prisoners as a
way to notify them that hostile behavior would not be tolerated at ADX
Florence. 2 26 The probe also revealed the officers' failure to properly report
the excessive force through memoranda or videotape as required by ADX
227
Florence policy.
In defending themselves against the charges, the named officers argued
that the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado erred in giving jury
instructions that allowed the jury to convict even if the prisoners only
presented de minimis injuries. 228 The LaVallee court quoted Brooks in
holding that the Eighth Amendment proscribes cruel and unusual force: "A
contrary holding would mean that 'a prisoner could constitutionally be
attacked for the sole purpose of causing pain as long as the blows were
inflicted in a manner that resulted in visible (or palpable or diagnosable)
injuries that were de minimis.' 229 The Tenth Circuit held that the jury
instructions were proper and that a prisoner need not prove a "certain level
or type of injury" to prevail on a claim of excessive force under the Eighth
Amendment. 230 Furthermore, in keeping with the arguments of the Third

221. Id.
222. Id. But see Cummings v. Malone, 995 F.2d 817, 822-23 (8th Cir. 1993) (inferring
that the Eighth Circuit requires a showing of more than de minimis injury); infra note 244
and accompanying text (discussing a case from a district court within the Eleventh Circuit
that cited to Cummings as Eighth Circuit authority on the injury requirement in an excessive
force case).
223. 439 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2006).
224. Id. at 687-88.
225. Id. at 677. United States v. La Vallee consolidated five cases that resulted from the
investigation. Id.
226. Id. at 678.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 687. The jury instructions defined "bodily injury" as "(1) a cut, abrasion,
bruise, burm, or disfigurement; (2) physical pain; (3) illness; (4) impairment of the function
of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or (5) any other injury to the body no matter
how temporary." Id.
229. Id. at 688 (quoting Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 108 (3d Cir. 2000)).
230. Id.
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Circuit in Brooks, the LaVallee court also rejected the Fourth Circuit's
23 1
holding in Norman v. Taylor.
5. The Eleventh Circuit: Johnson v. Breeden
In Johnson v. Breeden,232 the Eleventh Circuit also appeared to follow
the plain meaning of Hudson, although confusion has resulted from some
contrary dicta in the opinion. 233 The facts in Johnson were in dispute.
After a prison guard questioned inmate Ernest Johnson about his possession
of food from the prison store on a day when he was not allowed to have that
food, a disagreement broke out. 234 Johnson claimed that officers choked,
punched, and kicked him, then threw him to the floor and beat him with
batons until he lost consciousness. 235 Conversely, the officers claimed that
Johnson acted disorderly when confronted about the foodstuffs, and that he
injured himself when he fell on a heater and hit his head during the
altercation. 2 36 A hospital examination uncovered that Johnson sustained a
laceration, and multiple
closed head injury with swelling, an eyebrow
2 37
bruises on his face, shoulders, and upper back.
On appeal, the officers took issue with portions of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia's jury instructions, which were
"substantially verbatim" Eleventh Circuit jury instructions. 238 The last
provision of the instructions state, "Of course, when prison officials
maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, the result would be
cruel and usual punishment regardless of the significance of the injury to
the inmate." 239 The Eleventh Circuit held generally that the jury
instructions were not defective. 240 Although the level of injury was not
directly at issue in Johnson, the jury instructions demonstrate that, in the
Eleventh Circuit, an inquiry into the degree of injury is not required.
However, the Johnson court noted in dicta something seemingly contrary
to the jury instructions. In discussing the subjective inquiry in an Eighth
231. Id. at 687; see supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text (highlighting the Third
Circuit's view of Norman v. Taylor). But see infra notes 248-57 and accompanying text
(discussing Norman and the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the injury requirement).
232. 280 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2002).
233. See infra notes 241-45 and accompanying text (discussing case law within the
Eleventh Circuit that demonstrates this confusion).
234. Johnson, 280 F.3d at 1312.

235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1313. The officers argued that the jury should have to find that the officers
acted with specific intent before they could be held liable for excessive force under the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1314. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, stating that the test was
malicious and sadistic force and an intent to violate the inmate's rights to be free of cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. at 1315.
239. Id. at 1314; cf Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 505 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he
Supreme Court has suggested that the type of punishment, rather than some arbitrary
quantity of injury, may be relevant for Eighth Amendment claims.").
240. Johnson, 280 F.3d at 1316.
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Amendment case, the court stated that "[a]cting with specific malevolent
intent to cause harm, at least where (as here) more than de minimis injury
results, violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment."'24 1 Because of this dicta, the Eleventh Circuit supplied lower
courts with conflicting information as to the injury requirement in the
Eleventh Circuit. Conflicting opinions from those district courts, and even
the Eleventh Circuit itself, demonstrate this confusion. 242
For example, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama
cited Johnson in stating that the test for an excessive force claim was (1)
malicious and sadistic intent and (2) more than de minimis injury. 243
Likewise, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida agreed
that more than de minimis injury is necessary and cited various other circuit
courts that also take this stance. 244 Conversely, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Alabama aligned with the Eleventh Circuit jury
instructions discussed in Johnson and with the text of Hudson in finding
that the injury sustained is but one factor, and that the level of injury is
245
relevant to an Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.
B. De Minimis Injury, a ConstitutionalBar: The Second, Fourth,Fifth,
and Seventh Circuits'Approach
As demonstrated by case law from the Third, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits, the Hudson opinion explicitly stated that a prisoner need
not prove that he suffered serious injury to prevail on an Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim. 24 6 The policy reason for this stance is
that, if courts required a showing of serious injury, "the Eighth Amendment
would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman,
inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury. '"247 Nevertheless,
some circuits have read beyond the plain meaning of the Hudson text to

241. Id. at 1321.
242. See infra notes 243-45 and accompanying text (discussing confusion in courts
within the Eleventh Circuit about what level of injury is required).
243. McReynolds v. Ala. Dep't of Youth Servs., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1255 (M.D. Ala.
2006); see also McReynolds v. Ala. Dep't of Youth Servs., 204 F. App'x 819, 822 (11 th Cir.
2006) (where the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Alabama that more than de minimis injury is required, thereby contradicting Eleventh
Circuit jury instructions). But see supra note 239 (noting that in Harris, 97 F.3d at 505, the
Eleventh Circuit clearly affirmed that the central inquiry is into the force used, not the
quantum of injury sustained).
244. See Enriquez v. Landers, No. 2:02CV51OFTM-VMC-SPC, 2005 WL 2405829, at
*8 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2005) (citing Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1263-64 (4th Cir.
1994); Rankin v. Klevenhagen, 5 F.3d 103, 108 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also Cummings v.
Malone, 995 F.2d 817, 822-23 (8th Cir. 1993); infra Part II.B (discussing cases from the
Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits that require more than de minimis injury to
prevail on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim).
245. Walker v. Thames, No. Civ.A. 97-1104-RV-L, 2001 WL 394911, at *6 (S.D. Ala.
Mar. 30, 2001) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)).
246. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text; supra Part II.A.
247. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.
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find that, although a prisoner need not prove "serious" or "significant"
injury, he must prove more than de minimis injury to prevail.
1. The Fourth Circuit: Norman v. Taylor
Norman v. Taylor, a case from the Fourth Circuit, provides a detailed
explanation for interpreting Hudson to require more than de minimis injury.
In that case, inmate Allain Delont Norman was waiting to be processed for
admission to the Norfolk City Jail. 248 When Norman began to light up a
cigarette, Officer Otis Taylor rushed towards him, swinging his cell keys at
Norman's face to stop the act. 249 Taylor's keys clipped Norman's hand,
and Norman claimed that the impact caused his hand to swell. 250 Norman

argued that he filed at least fifteen doctor request forms regarding the
injury, but Taylor controverted this evidence by showing that Norman's
medical records were void of any reports referencing the injury to his
252
hand. 25 1 Taylor further denied that he hit Norman at all.
In an eight to five decision, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the entry of
summary judgment, holding that Norman's moving papers were void of any
facts from which the court could infer that he was injured at all, or at least
in more than a de minimis way. 253 The court supported its holding by
looking to a particular statement in Hudson, that "the blows directed at
Hudson, which caused bruises, swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked
dental plate, are not de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes. The
extent of Hudson's injuries thus provides no basis for dismissal of his §
1983 claim."2 54 The court believed that this statement "seemed to affirm by
negative implication ... that de minimis injury can serve as conclusive
evidence that de minimis force was used. ' 255 The court noted and
summarily dismissed that its reading of this passage was in tension with the
analyses of other circuits but did not cite specifically to cases that held
differently. 256 The court was nonetheless satisfied that its interpretation

248. Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1260 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1260-61. Allain Delont Norman also claimed that Otis Taylor antagonized
him by stating that he would not only hit his hand, but would also put the keys through his
heart. Id. at 1261.
251. Id.; cf Part III.B (discussing the danger of taking prisoners' medical records for face
value as these can easily be tampered with or doctored by prison employees).
252. Norman, 25 F.3d at 1261.
253. Id. at 1263.
254. Id. at 1262 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 2 (1992)).
255. Id. But see Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 108 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Although the
Norman reading is plausible, drawing instruction from Supreme Court passages through the
use of the negative pregnant is risky and unsatisfactory. We find the better reading of these
sentences to be the more straightforward one, drawn from the general teaching of Hudson:
i.e., the absence of significant resulting injury is not a per se reason for dismissing a claim
based on alleged wanton and unnecessary use of force against a prisoner.").
256. Norman, 25 F.3d at 1262 n.2.
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be so trifling
was correct: that the Supreme Court meant that injuries could
257
to justify a belief that an officer did not use excessive force.
Conversely, Judge Kenneth Hall, writing for the five-judge dissent,
argued that there were genuine issues of material fact that precluded
summary judgment. 258 Judge Hall found that the majority's negative
implication of Hudson was not necessarily improper because the extent of
an inmate's injury in certain situations could be so minor as to infer that the
force used was proportionately minimal. 259 However, on the facts, the
dissent highlighted Norman's affidavit, which stated that he suffered "'great
pain and swelling"' after being struck by a "large set of brass keys,"
rendering him without full mobility of his hand three years after the
not so trifling as to infer
incident. 260 Thus, Norman's injuries were
26 1
necessarily that the force was de minimis.
2. The Second Circuit: Gibeau v. Nellis
One year after the Fourth Circuit stated its holding in Norman, the
Second Circuit agreed that more than de minimis injury must be shown. In
Gibeau v. Nellis, 262 inmate Jacques Pierre Gibeau was involved in an
altercation after he complained about the prison coffee and dumped his cup
of coffee onto the floor in front of a corrections officer. 263 Following this
action, an officer directed him to return to his cell, at which Gibeau balked.
A group of guards then forced Gibeau toward his cell and responded to the
inmate's resistance by punching and slapping him. 264 Once officers forced
Gibeau into his cell, Officer James Lytle entered and, while Gibeau was
restrained in handcuffs, struck him three times with a penlight.2 65 When the
finger, wrist
entire disturbance settled, Gibeau had suffered a broken
266
injuries, bruising of the left temple, and blurred vision.
After a jury found that Lytle had used unnecessary and excessive force
but had not caused Gibeau any injuries, and the district court denied his
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Gibeau appealed. 267 On
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1264 (Hall, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 1265.
260. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Kenneth Hall also
emphasized that Norman had suffered "pain, fear, and possible psychological damage,"
which heightened the inmate's injury beyond that which the majority characterized as "a
sore thumb." Id. at 1265-66 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
261. Id.; cf Troy J. Aramburu, Note, The Role of "De Minimis" Injury in the Excessive
Force Determination: Taylor v. McDuffie and the Fourth Circuit Stand Alone, 14 BYU J.

PUB. L. 313, 324 (2000) (positing that a court should examine every aspect of an injury,
including the pain, the fear induced by the incident, and the possible psychological
aftereffects).
262. 18 F.3d 107 (2dCir. 1994).
263. Id. at 108.
264. Id. at 109.

265. Id. A penlight is a six-inch long, one-half-inch diameter flashlight. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
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appeal, Gibeau argued that, even though his head contusion could have
resulted from the tussle with the officers who forced him into his cell,
Hudson enabled him to recover for the pain, suffering, and fear Lytle
caused him when he struck him with the penlight. 268 The Second Circuit
disagreed, stating that Gibeau's reliance on Hudson was misplaced because
Hudson "merely holds that the Eighth Amendment may be violated where
excessive force causes any injury that is more than de minimis; it does not
injury under Section 1983
hold that there is necessarily a compensable
26 9
whenever excessive force has been used.
3. The Fifth Circuit: Siglar v. Hightower and Gomez v. Chandler
The Fifth Circuit first weighed in on its interpretation of the Hudson
standard in Siglar v. Hightower,270 a case filed under the PLRA. 27 1 In that
case, a prison guard stopped inmate Lee Andrew Siglar in the hall while
returning from breakfast. 2 72 After the officer found a biscuit from breakfast
in the inmate's jacket pocket, the officer called for backup. 273 Officer Ejike
Nwose responded to the call and, although unprovoked, verbally and
physically abused Siglar.274 Furthermore, Siglar claimed that Nwose
twisted his arm behind his back and twisted his ear for no apparent
275
reason.
In deciding whether Siglar had been subjected to excessive force when
the officer twisted his ear, leaving it bruised and sore for three days, the
court claimed that it looked to the Eighth Amendment standards to guide its
decision, "[t]hat is, the injury must be more than de minimis, but need not
be significant. '2 76 The court found that "a sore, bruised ear" was a de
evidence that Siglar had not
minimis injury, which served as dispositive
27 7
raised a valid Eighth Amendment claim.
The Fifth Circuit expanded on the Siglar holding in Gomez v.
Chandler.2 78 The Gomez opinion did not make it clear why prison guards
assaulted inmate Juan Gomez. However, Gomez claimed that the officials
slammed him to the concrete floor, punched him in the face, and scraped his

268. Id. at 110.
269. Id. But see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (stating that malicious use of

force for the sole purpose of causing harm is excessive whether or not significant injury
results); supra Part II.A (discussing cases that understand Hudson to require an inquiry into
the force used, rather than the injury sustained).
270. 112 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1997).
271. See id. at 193; see also supra note 213 (discussing Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623
(9th Cir. 2002), a case brought under the PLRA that also discussed the Eighth Amendment
injury requirement).
272. Siglar, 112 F.3dat 193.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. 163 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 1999).
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face along the floor. 279 Additionally, he alleged officers kicked him about
the face and head. 28 0 As a result, Gomez sustained cuts, scrapes, and
contusions to the face, head, and body.2 81 The court conceded that Hudson
placed the greatest emphasis on the inquiry into the degree of force, but
noted that Hudson did not specifically state that an excessive force claim
can prevail when there is no or only de minimis physical injury. 282 The
court then opined that, although a prisoner must have suffered more than de
minimis injury, the Fifth Circuit has "no categorical requirement that the
physical injury be significant, serious, or more than minor. ' 283 Gomez
succeeded on his excessive force claim primarily because the court found
that his injuries were more than de minimis. 284 In so holding, the court
compared Gomez's injuries to Siglar's. Although the court's discussion
focused on the application of force, which in Siglar was "far briefer and of
a character far less intense and less calculated to produce real physical
harm," 285 the holding, nevertheless, turned on the fact that Gomez had
received medical treatment, while Siglar had not, and that Gomez suffered
more extensive injuries than Siglar's bruised ear. 286
4. The Seventh Circuit: Outlaw v. Newkirk
Lurking in the background of the opinions from the circuits that require
some minimum quantum of injury is the precarious inference that in every
case de minimis injury is conclusive evidence that the force applied was
also de minimis. 28 7 The Seventh Circuit expressly stated this contention in
Outlaw v. Newkirk.288 In that case, inmate Ricky Outlaw claimed that
Officer Cameron Mable "slammed" the cuffport hatch-a small door within
the cell door-on his hand when Outlaw placed his hand in the cuffport
279. Id. at 924-25.
280. Id. at 925.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 923; see also Brown v. Lippard, 472 F.3d 384, 386-87 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating

that the Fifth Circuit had "never directly held that injuries must reach beyond some arbitrary
threshold to satisfy an excessive force claim," but that no injury or minor injury will not
support an Eighth Amendment claim).
283. Gomez, 163 F.3d at 924; see supra notes

182-83 and accompanying text

(commenting that the Court has failed to explain to lower courts what injuries would suffice
in any one of these categories).
284. Gomez, 163 F.3d at 924 ("We conclude that on this record Gomez... has made a
sufficient showing of a more than de minimis physical injury so as to preclude summary

judgment to the contrary.").
285. Id.
286. Id. at 924-25.
287. See, e.g., Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1262 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[D]e minimis
injury can serve as conclusive evidence that de minimis force was used."); Lunsford v.
Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1582 (7th Cir. 1994) ("This type of minor injury further supports our
conclusion that at most this incident was a de minimis use of force not intended to cause pain
or injury to the inmate."). But see, e.g., United States v. LaVallee, 439 F.3d 670, 687 (10th
Cir. 2006) (rejecting this contention); Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 108 (3d Cir. 2000)
(disagreeing that de minimis injury should mandate dismissal).
288. 259 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2001).
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while holding some trash. 28 9 The officer argued that, as he was closing the
cuffport, Outlaw attempted to throw garbage at him through it, and,
therefore, the cuffport's force on Outlaw's hand was accidental. 290 Mable
alternatively argued that inmates threaten to throw "harmful matter," like
garbage, feces, and urine, at prison officials regularly through the
cuffports. 291 Thus, his use of force to close the door was justified because it
was a good faith attempt to maintain prison security and protect his own
safety. 29 2 Outlaw claimed that he suffered severe pain resulting from his
293
swelled and bruised wrist.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Indiana's entry of summary judgment. 294 In so holding, the
court applied the Hudson test, looking directly at the force used, and agreed
that Mable may have either closed the door by accident or deliberately to
maintain order. 295 Although the Hudson inquiry could have ended there,
the court nonetheless went on to note that "the minor nature of Outlaw's
injuries strongly suggested that the force applied by Mable was de
minimis.

' 296

Interestingly, the court disregarded a strained and contentious

history between Outlaw and Mable that even the officer conceded to be
true. 297 The court skirted this issue by claiming that the Supreme Court had
not yet included nonviolent conflicts between inmates and prison officials
as one of the factors to consider in determining whether the force on the
occasion at issue was used maliciously or sadistically for the sole purpose
298
of causing harm.
III. WHY NEITHER SERIOUS NOR MORE THAN DE MINIMIS INJURY
SHOULD BE REQUIRED

This Note has highlighted the split between the many circuits over
whether a prisoner must prove more than de minimis injury to sustain an
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. Some circuit courts hold that a

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 834.
at 835.

at 834.
at 842.

295. Id. at 839.
296. Id. (citing DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 620 (7th Cir. 2000), where the Seventh
Circuit dismissed an inmate's claim because the use of force was an isolated shove into a
door frame without any additional violence, and where the bruises were not particularly
serious). But see infra notes 319-20 and accompanying text (quoting a dissenting judge in
the Fourth Circuit who urged that de minimis injury is not necessarily indicative of de
minimis force).
297. Outlaw, 259 F.3d at 836.
298. Id. at 840. The court opined that a strained relationship could not constitute
evidence that Cameron Mable used excessive force on that particular occasion. Id.; accord
supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the hands-off doctrine where courts gave deference to a prison
official's actions even if the facts could have been interpreted that the guard overstepped his
bounds by looking at the inmate's moving papers).

3198

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77

prisoner need not prove serious injury, thus strictly adhering to Justice
O'Connor's Hudson opinion.2 99 Conversely, other circuits have read into
Justice O'Connor's opinion and, by negative implication, hold that a
prisoner must suffer more than a trifling level of injury to prevail. 30 0 Part
III.A argues that the more than de minimis injury requirement is a guise that
courts are using to return to the hands-off doctrine, providing prison
officials far too much deference in cases of patently excessive force. Part
III.B posits that the more than de minimis injury requirement violates the
evolving standards of decency that guide the Eighth Amendment.
Ultimately, Part III.C advocates that, because prisoners cannot redress
constitutional violations without the assistance of federal courts, the only
way to rectify this split is if the Supreme Court intervenes and refines its
excessive force standard to state that no minimum quantum of injury is
required.
A. A Criticism of Courts' More than De Minimis Injury Requirement as a
Way to Remain Hands-Offto Prison Administration
Prior to the 1970s, the Court showed immense restraint in getting
involved in prison management. 30 1 The Court viewed itself and the lower
courts as without the expertise to reform prisons and in a precarious
position to show respect both for the decisions made by state legislatures
that are politically accountable and for prison officials who understand the
day-to-day operations of correctional facilities. 30 2 Between 1976 and 1992,
however, the Court parted from the hands-off doctrine. 303 The Court
involved itself in conditions-of-confinement cases where prisoners alleged
that they were unconstitutionally deprived of medical care, 304 forced to
reside in cells without a requisite amount of personal space, 305 subjected to
deadly force in the midst of a prison altercation, 30 6 and submitted to live in
overcrowded, unsanitary, and other similarly inhumane conditions. 30 7 The
Court's departure from its own precedent of nonintervention spoke volumes
to lower courts, prison reformers, and the general public that the judiciary
299. See supra Part II.A.
300. See supra Part II.B.

301. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text (discussing the pre-Gamble handsoff doctrine to which the Court stringently adhered).
302. See supra notes 146, 149-55 and accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 352 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979); MUSHLIN, supra note 22, at 9
(commenting that, since the early 1970s, "the Court has continually asserted that the [handsoff] doctrine has no place in its constitutional jurisprudence" (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott,
490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989))). But see White, supra note 153, at 776-77 (citing a shift during
the 1980s and 1990s back to the hands-off doctrine when the Court rejected inmate
challenges to searches on privacy grounds, access to legal literature, visitation rights, and
First Amendment rights in the religious realm, among others).
304. See generally Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); supra Part I.A.1.a.
305. See generally Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); supra Part I.A.l.b.
306. See generally Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986); supra Part I.A.l.c.
307. See generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991); supra Part I.A.l.d.
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would not stand idly by while inmates were robbed of basic human rights
308
and necessities.
When Hudson reached the Court, the previous prison cases had readied
most of the Justices to affirm that the Constitution proscribes the use of
needless force meted out as punishment, and further, that significant injury
is not a condition precedent to an excessive force claim.

30 9

Even though

Hudson imposed an extremely high burden for prisoners to prove310
malicious and sadistic force used for the sole purpose of causing harm Justice O'Connor's opinion was hailed as a victory for the prisoners' rights
1
bar.3 '
In the wake of Hudson, however, a handful of circuit courts have
3 12 in interpreting Hudson.3 13
misguidedly employed the negative pregnant
Rather than reading the plain meaning of the opinion-that an inmate need
not prove serious injury-these circuits have instead required some
31 4
quantum of injury that is more than de minimis, itself an undefined term.
308. See Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 179, at 442 (admiring judicial intervention in
prison cases because such activism was "both a cause and an effect of change: cause,
because judges forced change upon reluctant and recalcitrant prison officials, and effect
because litigation reinforced trends that were already well-underway and widely
embraced.... because judges drew on a well-defined model that had long been promoted
within the corrections field itself").
309. See Van Slyke, supra note 144, at 1729-30 (commenting that the Hudson Court
clearly articulated that in excessive force cases, the evolving standards of decency may be
violated even without permanent marks on an inmate's body); supra notes 116-22 and
accompanying text (discussing the majority opinion in Hudson that held that extent of injury
is merely one of many factors in determining whether a prison official used force
maliciously and sadistically for the sole purpose of causing harm).
310. See FLITER, supra note 23, at 172 (calling the Wilson decision a "setback for prisoner
litigants" and noting that proof of intent "places a greater burden" on prisoners); Van Slyke,
supra note 144, at 1730 (opining that the extension of Whitley to all excessive force cases
imposes on prisoners "a virtually insurmountable burden of proof' that "creates a roadblock
to obtaining redress for inmates' grievances"); supra notes 115, 126, 127, 131 and
accompanying text (discussing the arguments for and against the extension of the Whitley
standard to all excessive force cases).
311. See, e.g., Jennifer Buehler, Note, Hudson v. McMillian: Rejecting the Serious Injury
Requirement, but Embracing the Malicious-and-SadisticStandard,42 CATH. U. L. REV. 683,
716 (1993) (concluding that Hudson reflected a "positive step toward preserving prisoners'
civil rights under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause"); Van Slyke, supra note 144,
at 1729-30 (acknowledging Hudson as a "victory for inmates" and a "landmark
breakthrough in prisoners' rights").
312. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 182, at 1061 ("[A negative pregnant is a]
denial implying its affirmative opposite by seeming to deny only a qualification of the
allegation and not the allegation itself. An example is the statement, 'I didn't steal the
money last Tuesday,' the implication being that the theft might have happened on another
day."); see also supra note 255 (noting that the Brooks court found that using the negative
pregnant to interpret Hudson was "risky and unsatisfactory").
313. See infra Part III.B. But see supra notes 211, 213, 231, 255 and accompanying text
(noting the other circuits that disagree with the idea that Hudson prescribes, by negative
implication, a fixed quantum of injury to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim).
314. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (observing that the Court and lower
courts have failed to define what constitutes de minimis injury for an Eighth Amendment
inquiry); cf supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (commenting that various Eighth
Amendment vocabulary has not been adequately defined by the Court).
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The more than de minimis injury requirement appears to hark back to
pre-Gamble, where prisoners were considered slaves of the state, stripped of
their most basic rights once they entered prison. 3 15 Without explicitly
stating it, these circuits seem to affirm the once-held belief that prisoners
may forfeit their substantive constitutional right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment-even in cases where force is meted out as
punishment 3 16-where the prison officials are lucky enough to inflict only
3 17
minor, fleeting injuries that may require minimal or no medical attention.
Moreover, because the general public does not appear to care any more
about prisoners' rights now than it did when the hands-off doctrine was in
full effect, 3 18 this enables courts to further acquiesce in the face of needless
constitutional violations.
In these circuits, one is only left to wonder, as Judge Francis
Murnaghan-the sole dissenter in a post-Norman case in the Fourth
Circuit-did when he asked his fellow judges to think about applying their
standard to certain scenarios. 3 19 Judge Murnaghan queried how the more
than de minimis injury requirement could ever apply in situations where a
prisoner "thrown from a prison balcony, is fortunate to incur only minor
scrapes and bruises. Or ...an inmate who, although beaten intensely in the

315. See White, supra note 153, at 777 ("The shift back to the hands-off approach
represents in juridical form the more practical dynamic of violence as a mode of
punishment."); supra notes 142-47 (explaining the stance that courts took toward prisoners
prior to the 1970s).
316. See, e.g., supra notes 270-77 and accompanying text (noting in Siglar v. Hightower
that the court found that the inmate did not demonstrate sufficient injury, even though an
officer caused the inmate's ear to be bruised and sore for three days for absolutely no
penological reason).
317. See supra text accompanying note 137 (highlighting Justice Thomas's dissent in
Hudson where he callously stated that "insignificant harm" cannot be redressed in a court
because such harm does not evince the use of cruel and unusual punishment).
318. See, e.g., JULIAN V. ROBERTS & MICHAEL J. HOUGH, UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC

ATTITUDES TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 93-94 (2005) (citing a 2001 study's finding that six out of
ten Americans surveyed agreed that "criminals don't mind being sent to prison" and urging
that "[i]t is critically important, therefore, that the public have a more realistic idea of the
nature of life in prison" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jessica Feierman, Creative
Prison Lawyering: From Silence to Democracy, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 249,
269 (2004) (stating that prisoners are politically unpopular, few people care about conditions
of confinement, and the public is ignorant about what transpires inside correctional facilities,
thus enabling inmate abuse and dismal confinement conditions to "spiral out of control");
Rick Diguette, Seven Faces of Freedom and Justice, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 13, 2007, at
A23 ("Most people don't care about prisoners. Once someone goes behind bars, he ceases to
be a normal person. And once he ceases to be a normal person, it is unlikely he will ever be
considered normal again."); Robert Weisberg & David Mills, Violence Silence: Why No
One Really Cares About Prison Rape, SLATE, Oct. 1, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/
2089095 (arguing that prison violence is so pervasive that it "has become a clich6 within
mainstream culture," resulting in a total indifference to excessive force in prisons by the
general public and judges alike); cf supra note 144 and accompanying text (commenting on
public apathy that has historically been felt toward prisoners' rights).
319. See Taylor v. McDuffie, 155 F.3d 479, 486-87 (4th Cir. 1998) (Murnaghan, J.,
dissenting).
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stomach, back, chest, or groin, displays no greater outward signs of physical
injury than that which the majority terms 'temporary swelling."'' 320
Hudson provided a basic framework and imposed a high burden,
requiring that (1) the allegedly offending guard used malicious and sadistic
force for the sole purpose of causing harm (subjective intent), and (2) the
force rose to a constitutionally violative level, by looking at the need for the
force used, the threats facing the official, any attempt to temper the severity
of the force, and the resulting injuries (objective harm). 32 1 However, the
application of the hands-off doctrine by the circuits requiring more than de
minimis injury creates an even more elevated burden for prisoners and,
arguably, an insurmountable standard to obtain redress. This heightened
standard begs the question: what will stop courts within these circuits from
ever using the backdoor reasoning that the injury was insufficient, even in
situations like those posed by Judge Murnaghan?
Furthermore, since the enactment of the PLRA only a few years after
Hudson was handed down, prisoners are now faced with even greater
obstacles to relief.3 22 Congress passed the PLRA in part because it
considered prisoners pestiferous litigants who have nothing better to do
with their free time than file suits to achieve some form of remedy. 323
Moreover, Congress did not want courts to load their already unmanageable
dockets with frivolous cases that had little or no recovery. 324 However,
because Hudson announced that excessive force claims are not frivolous
when force is meted out as punishment, circuits imposing the requirement
of a particular level of injury are merely adding insult to injury by
appending this additional, unfounded, and unsubstantiated roadblock that
325
Hudson did not prescribe.

320. Id. at 486. Judge Francis Murnaghan's dissent criticized the majority for drawing a
negative implication that was in direct conflict with the text of Hudson and that bought into
the "fiction that de minimis injury means de minimis force." Id.; see also Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (agreeing with the
majority's holding because "to hold to the contrary... might place various kinds of statesponsored torture and abuse-of the kind ingeniously designed to cause pain but without a
telltale 'significant injury'-entirely beyond the pale of the Constitution").
321. See supra text accompanying notes 116, 119 (detailing the Hudson factors).
322. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text (explaining the onerous
requirements the PLRA imposed on prisoners to sustain a claim in federal court).
323. See Robbins v. Chronister, 402 F.3d 1047, 1055 (10th Cir. 2005) (Hartz, J.,
dissenting); Witzke v. Femal, 376 F.3d 744, 750 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Prisoners often have an
abundance of time, while facing a restricted number of enjoyable activities with which to
pass the time other than filing federal suits.").
324. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text (discussing the PLRA's purpose and
the requirements it sets out for prisoners filing for redress in federal courts).
325. See Ann H. Mathews, Note, The Inapplicabilityof the Prison Litigation Reform Act
to Prisoner Claims of Excessive Force, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 536, 553-54 (2002) (arguing that
the PLRA should exempt excessive force claims because they "involve more fundamentally
willful and brutal behavior by prison officials than other prisoner claims," which require
court intervention rather than internal prison resolution).
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B. Why the More than De Minimis Injury Requirement Offends the
Evolving Standards of Decency
Not only does the more than de minimis injury requirement appear to
invoke the hands-off doctrine, it also clearly violates the evolving standards
of decency upon which the Eighth Amendment is predicated. 326 For
example, the de minimis injury requirement enables prison officials to
intercept an excessive force claim and perpetuates a known problem in
correctional facilities-that prison officials substantiate each other's
fabricated stories and falsified documents in the face of constitutional
violations. 32 7 Because medical documentation forms part of a record that
must be construed as true for summary judgment purposes, many prison
officials are dodging punishment for excessive force because of cronyism
and corroboration of false medical records. 32 8 In circuits that require more
than de minimis injury, prison officials can falsify documents to say that
inmates suffered negligible or no injury and seemingly survive an excessive
329
force claim without question.
The Court has explained that deliberate indifference to medical care does
not accord with the evolving standards of decency; 330 therefore, when
prison medical staff or colleague officials vouch for each other to remove
any possible sting of an Eighth Amendment violation, evolving standards of
decency are contravened. As such, it is the responsibility of courts not to
end the inquiry at the quantum of injury, as it is possible that the court may
never know the extent of injury truly suffered.

326. See generally supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the importance of looking to the evolving
standards of decency in determining what comports with the Eighth Amendment).
327. See, e.g., United States v. LaVallee, 439 F.3d 670, 678-79 (10th Cir. 2006)
(exposing situations at the U.S. Penitentiary Administrative Maximum Facility in Florence,
Colorado, where officers colluded to falsify medical records and other documents after
various violent inmate beatings); Editorial, supra note 10 (discussing California's
correctional officer union that interferes with administrative and criminal investigations of
excessive force in order to enforce the code of silence that is prevalent across California's
prisons).
328. See, e.g., Sanders-El v. Spielman, 38 F. Supp. 2d 438, 439 n.1 (D. Md. 1999) ("[I]t
would seem that the law must entertain the possibility that health care providers in a prison
setting might bring certain biases to their occupation, be they.., the need to maintain good
working relationships with correctional officers, [or] pressures exerted and felt within the
chain of command ....
");Purdy, supra note 1 (reporting that a prison nurse conceded that
he would be reluctant to report excessive force because "life can be made difficult if you
don't have cooperation from the security staff').
329. See, e.g., Purdy, supra note 1 (discussing a case at the Clinton Correctional Facility
where a prisoner suffered bruised ribs and a separated shoulder that took two months to heal,
but the nurse on duty that day falsely reported that there were "no apparent injuries");
Testimony of John Boston, supra note 177, at 15 (noting that excessive force generally
engenders other correctional officer misconduct, including false reports, reliance on a code
of silence, complicity, and patent dishonesty that only further stimulates inmate abuse); cf
United States v. Miller, 477 F.3d 644, 647 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that several jailers wrote
false reports stating that the inmate had been resisting officials and acting in a combative
manner, thus justifying the use of force).
330. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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C. A Return to the Plain Meaning of Hudson: The Third, Sixth, Eighth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits'ApproachIs Proper
It appears that little has changed in the realm of excessive force since
Hudson. Prison continues to be a dangerous place for prisoners and
correctional officers alike. Moreover, the use of excessive force has not
diminished so substantially that it is no longer fodder for the news. 3 31 Even
correctional facilities' "strict rules" against excessive force are consistently
violated, 332 and always at the expense of prisoners' substantive
constitutional right against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.
Courts must rectify such constitutional violations by employing the
Hudson standard: that a prisoner's injury is one of many factors that must
be addressed and, further, that the level of force-whether it was used
unnecessarily and wantonly for the sole purpose of causing harm-is the
fundamental inquiry in such cases. 3 33 Importantly, Hudson explicitly stated
334
that the level of injury should not be employed as a dispositive factor.
As such, courts should be wary of finding that an inmate's de minimis
injury is conclusive evidence that the prison official used de minimis
force. 33 5 When an inmate is attacked by a prison official for no reason, or
for a justified reason but in a malicious and sadistic way to cause harm,
even if the injury is de minimis in either situation, a violation has occurred.
Thus, the extent of the injury should never be the sole inquiry, and a case
should not turn on the improper inference that de minimis injury means de
336
minimis force was used.
This Note does not advocate that every claim of excessive force warrants
judicial intervention. 337 Rather, as the Hudson Court held, it argues that the
level of injury must be examined as one of many factors of the objective
inquiry in an Eighth Amendment excessive force case. 338 Under the factors
test, a court is required to look at the totality of the circumstances-whether
the force was even warranted under the given circumstances, whether it was
used for the sole purpose of causing harm, if the offending official could
have tempered the situation in any way so as not to use force, and, also,

331. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (noting various news articles published
since Hudson, reflecting the lack of change in correctional officers' use of excessive force).
332. See supra text accompanying note 3.
333. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
334. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) ("The absence of serious injury is
therefore relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.").
335. See supra note 320 and accompanying text (commenting that Judge Murnaghan, a
dissenting judge to the Fourth Circuit's negative implication of Hudson, believed the jump
from de minimis injury to de minimis force was a dangerous "fiction").
336. See Taylor v. McDuffie, 155 F.3d 479, 487 (4th Cir. 1998) (Mumaghan, J.,

dissenting) ("[O]fficers in our circuit are free to use excessive or unjustified force against
inmates, so long as they are careful or fortunate enough to leave only minor traces of their
blows."); supra note 320 and accompanying text.
337. See supra note 123 (citing an often quoted statement that not every push or shove in
prison invokes the Eighth Amendment).
338. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.

3204

FORDHAMLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 77

what level of injury the prisoner sustained. 339 Because of colluding prison
officials who deny that force was used or injuries were sustained, 340 or
because injuries might not manifest in a way that a court deems sufficient
for this inquiry, prisoners are in a catch-22: they face the wrath of their
superiors, and their only avenue of redress is blocked.
Moreover, this Note urges that officials who engage in deprivations of
prisoners' constitutional rights should not expect deference from federal
courts and, furthermore, that courts should similarly not buy into the fiction
that prisoner abuse is not occurring rampantly throughout U.S. correctional
facilities. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is rendered moot
without the intervention of federal courts, the entities responsible for
upholding the meaning of this important clause. 34 1 The Eighth Amendment
"was designed expressly to protect the weak and powerless from the
passions, or the reckless neglect, of the majority and its leaders. '342 It is
time for the circuit courts requiring more than de minimis injury to enforce
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause so that correctional officers no
longer retain the power to violate prisoners' constitutional rights. Perhaps
the only way to ensure that these circuit courts align with Hudson is for the
Supreme Court once again to intervene on the issue of excessive force and
qualify the level of injury, if any, that prisoners must prove. Unless and
until the Court weighs in, a handful of circuit courts will continue to
obstruct unjustly prisoners' access to redress that they deserve when their
343
substantive constitutional rights are violated.
CONCLUSION

In July 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division,
released a scathing ninety-eight-page report regarding conditions at the
Cook County Jail (CCJ) in Chicago, Illinois. 344 Specifically, the report
detailed twenty-three instances of prisoner abuse and excessive force at CCJ
and highlighted situations where officers initially used force appropriately,
but continued to engage in unnecessary and wanton physical violence even
339. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (explaining the factors test for an
excessive force claim).
340. See supra notes 327-30 and accompanying text.
341. See supra Part I.C.2 (highlighting arguments from judges, scholars, and
commentators who believe that federal courts must intervene in excessive force cases).
342. Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 979 (D.R.I. 1977). This opinion went on
to state that affording prison officials broad discretion to maintain order cannot be given in
exchange for "judicial abdication from the enforcement of basic constitutional rights of
inmates to a reasonably safe and sanitary environment." Id.
343. See Taylor v. McDuffie, 155 F.3d 479, 487 (4th Cir. 1998) (Mumaghan, J.,
dissenting) ("I expect that soon the Supreme Court will place the Fourth Circuit back on the
course intended by Hudson. Until that day, I fear the injustice that awaits [prisoners] in our
nation's jails.").
344. See generally Letter from Grace Chung Becker, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., and
Patrick J. Fitzgerald, U.S. Attorney, N. Dist. of Ill., to Todd H. Stroger, Cook County Bd.
President, and Thomas Dart, Cook County Sheriff (July 11, 2008), available at
http://www.john-howard.org/imagesfUSATTYLEtteronCCJAIL-July.2008.pdf.
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after the inmates were under control. 34 5 Illinois courts are now keenly
aware of CCJ's systemic use of excessive force, and the jail is required to
make important changes to its policies and practices, or face possible legal
346
action by the state.
Because not every prisoner who faces the wrath of his superiors has the
state's attorney watching prison guards' actions-as is the case with CCJprisoners will continue to file for redress in federal courts after prison
officials subject them to excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. However, even though Hudson provided a definitive factors
test to analyze Eighth Amendment excessive force cases, the Court failed to
define explicitly an essential element for the test-the level of injury
required to sustain a claim-thereby creating an ambiguity and a dichotomy
in the wake of the seminal case. Some circuits correctly follow Hudson in
holding that a prisoner does not need to prove significant injury to prevail,
while other circuits have marred the standard, requiring some quantum of
injury that is more than de minimis, even though Justice O'Connor's
opinion did not prescribe such a factor.
As a result, prisoners who sustain virtually the same injuries in different
prisons could face disparate outcomes depending on the arbitrary fact of
which circuit's law controls their cases. Unfortunately, courts that require
more than de minimis injury are reviving the hands-off doctrine and, in
doing so, supporting a culture of violence in prison. Since 1976, the handsoff stance has been criticized by the Supreme Court and legal commentators
because court intervention is an essential avenue for prisoners when
superiors violate prisoners' constitutional rights. Moreover, if courts can
dismiss a case based solely on the de minimis injury threshold requirement,
this violates the evolving standards of decency that are essential
benchmarks of Eighth Amendment objectives. With these standards
desecrated, not only are inmates harmed, but the will of the general public
and the words of the Constitution are also contravened.
The circuits that require more than de minimis injury do not appear ready
to step down from their stance; therefore, it is important for the Supreme
Court to resolve this circuit split and announce that no fixed quantum of
injury is required. This is what Hudson prescribed, and this is the only
reasonable application of the case when excessive force is used wantonly
and unnecessarily in violation of the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.

345. Id. at 9-18.
346. Id. at 98.
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